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"The Convention's goal is to establish white supremacy in 
the State, within the limits imposed by the Federal Consti-
tution." 
John B. Knox, Alabama Delegate) 
INTRODUCTION 
Minority voting rights are dead-the majority rules. In the last 
century and a half, minority access to the ballot box has been, if 
not killed, then at least rendered largely unenforceable by a combi-
nation of racial bias in the criminal justice system and the Supreme 
Court's so-called "color-blind" jurisprudence, with the result that 
meaningful minority access to the electoral process has been great-
ly diminished. Minority disenfranchisement has moved in cycles, 
from intentional, direct, de jure disenfranchisement before the Civil 
War, through indirect means of exclusion (including felon disen-
franchisement) following Reconstruction and passage of the Fif-
teenth Amendment, to the United States Supreme Court's "color-
blind" jurisprudence, which has interacted with the last remnants of 
de jure disenfranchisement to complete the cycle of exclusion. At 
the turn of the twenty-rrrst century, the Supreme Court has come 
full circle, conjuring up language and imagery more appropriate to 
the nineteenth century's Dred Scott and Plessy Courts. The Court's 
color blindness has interacted with historical remnants of intention-
al discrimination so as to all but nullify the Voting Rights Act! 
and the equal protection clause, perpetuating the legacy of inten-
tional disenfranchisement as effectively as any post-civil war "black 
code." 
Many scholars have addressed specific changes and remedies 
that might make remedies more fair or feasible, or make the Vot-
ing Rights Act more effective.3 This Article explores the premise 
I. Official Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of the State of Alabama, May 
21, 1901, to Sept 3d, 1901 (Second Day) (1901) (statement of Delegate John B. Knox 
concerning convict disenftanchisement provisions). 
2. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat 437 (1965) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 
1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1 (1994». 
3. See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, Just Politics? Five Not So Easy Pieces of the 1995 
Term, 34 Hous. L. REv. 289 (1997); see also LAN! GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE 
MAJORITY 69, 72 (1994) [hereinafter GUINIER, TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY] (arguing that 
the Voting Rights Act should embody the civil rights movement's "transfonnative vision 
of politics"); Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and the 
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that the Supreme Court's "color-blind" jurisprudence has interacted 
with systematic problems such as the disproportionate 
criminalization of minorities and the last remaining Jim Crow 
laws4 to all but nullify the Voting Rights Act's mission to provide 
meaningful ballot access for minority populations. This Article 
examines the cycle of exclusion from the Civil War to the present 
It begins by examining the Civil War and Reconstruction-era Jim 
Crow laws and the agonizingly slow process of establishing 
meaningful access to the ballot box that culminated with the Vot-
ing Rights Act The Article next examines the systematic disman-
tling of minority voting rights through the interaction of Jim Crow 
felon disenfranchisement laws and the Supreme Court's "color-
blind" jurisprudence. Finally, the Article proposes that any changes 
to the Voting Rights Act will be illusory unless the Court aban-
dons the fiction of the "color-blind" Constitution and returns to an 
equal protection analysis of any procedure that burdens minority 
groups from achieving effective access to the ballot box. 
I. THE CYCLE OF MINORI1Y DISENFRANClllSEMENT BEGINS 
"This plan of popular suffrage will eliminate the darkey as 
a political factor in this State in less than five years, so 
that in no single county of the Commonwealth will there be 
the least concern felt for the complete supremacy of the 
white race in the affairs of government." 
Carter Glass, Virginia DelegateS 
Theory of Black Electoral Success, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1077, 1084-85 (1991) [hereinafter 
Guinier, Triumph of Tokenism] (analyzing different voting sttategies in the context of the 
civil rights movement's quest for human dignity). For a detailed and thoughtful proposal 
for a Voting Rights Act analysis of the impact of disenfranchising ex-felons on minority 
voting strength, see Alice E. Harvey, Ex-Felon Disenfranchisement and Its Influence on 
the Black Vote: The Need for a Second Look, 142 U. PA. L. REv. 1145 (1994) • 
.c. The term "Jim Crow" reportedly first appeared in the North in the 18305 as a 
song title in a minstrel show in which white perfonners performed in "blackface" and 
parodied blacks in a derogatory manner. By the 184Os, it was applied to racially segregat-
ed Massachusetts railroad cars and became a generic term for discriminatory race laws. 
See generally C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CRow 7 n.68 (1966). 
s. 2 REPORT OF TIlE PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF TIlE CONSTmmONAL CONVEN-
TION OF VIRGINIA 3076 (1906) [hereinafter VIRGINIA PROCEEDINGS] (statement of Delegate 
Carter Glass). Delegate Glass, who later became a United States senator, said the purpose 
of the law was to eliminate "every Negro voter who can be gotten rid of." Benna C. 
Schmidt, Jr., Principle and Prejudice: The Supreme Court and Race in the Progressive 
Era. Part I: The Heyday of Jim Crow, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 835, 846 (1982); see also 
John Hope Franklin, "Legal" Disenfranchisement of the Negro, 26 J. NEGRO EDUC. 241, 
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Race-based exclusion of minority voters is long standing and 
deeply rooted. Restrictions on minority voting access have gone 
through three distinct phases: outright, explicit disenfranchisement; 
indirect disenfranchisement through adoption of laws and practices 
that burdened minority voting; and most recently, the Supreme 
Court's systematic destruction of all remedies for anything but 
outright, explicit disenfranchisement. 
A. From De Jure to De Facto Disenfranchisement 
"[Tlhe most dangerous threat to democracy is the Ne-
gro. . . . The Negro is an uncontrollable objector to our 
[all-white] ticket." 
The Commercial, Pine Bluff, Arkansas, 18926 
Passage of the Thirteenth Amendment did not automatically 
confer the right to vote.7 Women of all races continued to be dis-
enfranchised until passage of the Nineteenth Amendment, but even 
those freedmen ostensibly made full citizens by the abolition of 
slavery8 did not automatically obtain the franchise.9 Indeed, the 
241 n.l (1957) (noting that in 1890, some whites were celebrating the apparent defeat of 
black voting initiatives); id. at 246 (quoting Delegate Glass as stating the intent to elimi-
nate African-American voters legally, "without materially impairing the numerical strength 
of the white electorate''). For the definitive history of the disenfranchisement of African-
Americans in the Reconstruction era, see generally J. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING 
OF SOlTI'HERN POLITICS: SUFFRAGE REsTRIcnON AND TIlE Es'rABUSHMENT OF TIlE ONE-
PARTY Soum, 1880-1910 (1974). 
6. The Commercial, Pine Bluff, Arkansas, 1892. The Pine Bluff Commercial, a Pine 
Bluff, Arkansas, newspaper, stressed the racial purpose of the poll tax, urging voters to 
pass it "because the most dimgerous threat to democracy is the Negro. • • • The Negro is 
an uncontrollable objector to our [all-white] ticket." See C. Calvin Smith, The Politics of 
Evasion: Arkansas' Reaction to Smith v. Allwright, 1944, 17 J. NEGRO HIsr. 47 (1982) 
(copy on file with author). 
7. See A. LEON HiGGINBOTIIAM, JR., IN TIlE MA'ITER OF CoLOR: RACE AND TIlE 
AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS: THE COLONIAL PERIOD 147 (1978) ("Emancipation was not 
the key that unlocked the door to full equality.''). Even in New York State, where slavery 
was abolished before the Civil War, "if emancipation were tied to the granting of equal 
civil rights to blacks, the majority of New Yorkers were willing to allow slavery to con-
tinue in their midst." Id. 
8. When the Civil War began, and even at the time of the Emancipation Proclama-
tion, no clear plans existed for protecting the rights of the freedmen. See HERMAN BEU, 
EMANCIPATION AND EQUAL RIGHTS: POLITICS AND CONS1TfUTIONAUSM IN TIlE CIvIL 
WAR ERA 66, 67 (1978). From 1862 to 1865, however, Congress took a number of steps 
toward improving the freedmen's lot. see id. at 67, creating the Freedmen's Bureau in 
1865 to provide relief and to rent land to the freedmen. See id. at 70-72; see also Alex-
ander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARv. L. 
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denial of voting rights on the basis of race or previous condition 
of servitude was both legal and widely practiced. 
1. Reconstruction: Intentional, Indirect Disenfranchlsement 
"Fortunately, the opportunity is offered the white people of 
the State in the coming election to obviate all future dan-
ger and fortify Anglo-Saxon civilization against every as-
sault from within and without, aid that is the calling of a 
constitutional convention to deal with the all important 
question of suffrage." 
Columbia, S.C., Daily Register, Oct. 10, 189410 
Following the 1870 ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution, providing that "[t]he right of citi-
zens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or 
abridged . . . on account of race, color, or previous condition of 
servitude,',ll direct de jure ballot exclusion of the freedmen12 
was illegal. Violence, intimidation,13 and fraud14 persisted, how-
REv. I, 8 n.20 (1955). 
9. See JOHN M. MATHEWS, LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL HIsTORY OF TIlE FlFrEENnI 
.AMENDMENT 36 (1909) (noting that the language of the FIfteenth Amendment did not 
guarantee the right to vote). See generally WIllIAM GILLETTE, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: POL-
mcs AND TIlE PASSAGE OF TIlE FlFrEENnI .AMENDMENT 22-23 (1965). Moreover, "from 
the ratification of the [Fourteenth] Amendment in 1868 to 1870 not a single state, with 
the sole exception of Minnesota, heeded the warning or yielded to the inducement of the 
suffrage clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." William Pickens, The Constitutional Status 
of the Negro from 1860 to 1870, in THE AMERICAN NEGRO ACADEMY OCcAsIONAL PA-
PERS 63, 66 (1899) (copy on file with author). But see DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE 
NOT SAVED: THE ELusIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JU5nCE 75-88 (1987) (analyzing the "Ulti-
mate Voting Rights Act''); Grier Stephenson, Jr., The Supreme Court, the Franchise, and 
the Fifteenth Amendment: The First Sixty Years, 57 uMKC L. REv. 47, 47 (1988) (argu-
ing that the Supreme Court improperly has ignored the FIfteenth Amendment). 
10. DAILY REGISTER (Colombia, S.C.), Oct. 10, 1894, reprinted in George B. Tindall, 
The Campaign for the Disenfranchisement of Negroes in South Carolina, 15 J.S. HIST. 
212, 224 (1949). 
II. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1. 
12. All potential minority voters in this era were male, as women remained disenfran-
chised until passage of the Nineteenth Amendment. 
13. See Tindall, supra note 10, at 213. One account noted: 
Seeking to impress on blacks the perils of political involvement, armed bands 
rode through the countryside at night during the weeks preceding elections, 
firing smaIl arms and sometimes even canon, [sic] and patrolled polling places 
on election day. And when they did resort to beatings and murders, they usual-
ly defined their targets carefully and struck quickly rather than inaugurating an 
ongoing campaign of terror. 
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ever, and white supremacists quickly sought legal but indirect 
hurdles to minority voting, IS including the manipulation of voting 
requirements.16 Unable to bar the freedmen from voting outright 
without having their state's representation reduced in Congress, 
white southerners created "whites-only" primaries,17 so that the 
general election became a mere runoff between white-preferred 
candidates in which minority voters had a vote, but no real 
voice. IS After Smith v. Allwrighr9 struck down Texas' all-white 
primary system,20 Arkansas, which had the same system, attempt-
ed to circumvent the holding by imposing lengthy residence re-
quirements,21 limiting party membership22 to whites and establish-
DONAlD G. NIEMAN, PROMISES TO KEEP: AFRICAN-AMERICANS AND TIm CoNSTITImONAL 
ORDER, 1776 TO TIm PREsENT, 90-91 (1991). This subtext of terror persisted until the 
present. Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee organizer Fannie Lou Hamer noted 
the perils of democracy in "the land of the tree and the home of the grave," recounting 
the murders of Vemon Dahmer, James Chaney, Medger Evers and others. Neil R. 
McMillan, Black Enfranchisement in Mississippi: Federal Enforcement and Black Protest 
in the 1960s, 43 J.S. RlST. 351, 351, 354 (1977) (citing an interview with Fannie Lou 
Hamer, Mississippi Oral History Program, University of Southern Mississippi, Apr. 14, 
1972). 
14. See NIEMAN, supra note 13 at 92. 
IS. W.E.B. Du BOIS, BLACK RECONSlRucnON IN AMERICA, 1860-1880, at 5-7 
(MacMillan 1992) (1962). 
16. See James E. Alt, The Impact of the Voting Rights Act on Black and White Voter 
Registration in the South, in Qumr REvOLtmON IN TIm Soum: THE IMPAer OF TIm 
VOI1NG RIGHTS Aer, 1965-1990, at 351, 354-56 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman, 
eds., 1994) (analyzing the effects of institutional mechanisms affecting voter registration in 
electing white candidates and keeping blacks in a subordinate position); Tindall, supra 
note 10, at 213; see also Armand Derfner, Racial Discrimination and the Right to Vote, 
26 VAND. L. REv. 523 (1973) (giving a detailed analysis of the elaborate mechanisms 
used to suppress and nullify minority voting, and the long legal battles against these de-
vices). 
17. See Pamela S. Karlan, The Rights to Vote: Some Pessimism About Formalism, 71 
TEx. L. REv. 1705, 1709-10 (1993). 
18. See generally JOEL GRAY TAYLOR, LoUISIANA REcoNSlRUCfED, 1863-1877 (1974). 
19. 321 U.S. 649 (1944). 
20. See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 469 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 
664 (1944); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 89 (1932); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 
540-41 (1927) (holding that a Texas statute that established that "in no event shall a ne-
gro be eligible to participate in a Democratic party primary election" violates equal pro-
tection). Collectively, these are the "White Primary Cases," overturning anti-black Texas 
election tactics. For a thorough analysis of the events leading up to these cases, see 
Darlene Clark Hine, The Elusive Ballot: The Black Struggle Against the Texas Democratic 
White Primary, 1932-45, 81 TEx. STATE RlST. Q. at 371 (copy on file with author). 
21. See Alt, supra note 16, at 354-56 (describing the "Magnolia formula" adopted in 
Mississippi in 1890 and copied elsewhere, combining literacy or understanding require-
ments, residence requirements and poll taxes to allow disenfranchising migrant workers as 
well as former slaves); see also, e.g., Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679, 680 (1973) 
(Arizona's 50-day residency rule ''pass[es] constitutional muster" because "sufficiently 
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ing separate primaries and run-off elections for black and white 
voters.23 Non-party members could only vote in the primaries if 
they accepted the principles of the 1874 Arkansas Constitution, 
which included complete racial segregation, a ban on interracial 
marriage, and payment of a poll tax.24 
By the early 19OOs, a majority of states with large populations 
of freedmen had adopted poll taxes that effectively eliminated 
many potential African-American voters from the polls.2S The 
Harman v. Forsseniu?' Court expressly noted the use of poll tax-
es as a means to disenfranchise blacks,27 and barred their use as a 
qualification for voting in federal elections.28 Literacf9 and "un-
strong local interests," such as the preparation of accurate voter lists, were demonstrated 
in support of the rule); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 358-59 (1972) (holding that the 
relation between Tennessee's one-year residency requirement and state's interest in an in-
formed electorate too attenuated to be found compelling). Virginia's 1902 Constitution re-
quired a one-year residency for voter registration, a restriction that endured until it was 
struck down by a federal court in 1970. See Bufford v. Holton, 319 F. Supp. 843, 846 
(B.D. Va. 1970), ajfd sub nom. Virginia State Bd. of Elections v. Bufford, 405 U.S. 
1035 (1972); Andrews v. Cody, 327 F. Supp. 793 (M.D.N.C. 1971), aJfd, 405 U.S. 1034 
(1972) (holding that North Carolina's one-year residency requirement violated equal protec-
tion). 
22. Party membership was required for primary voting. See, e.g., Smith v. AlIwright, 
321 U.S. at 664-65: 
The privilege of membership in a party may be • • • no concern of a state. 
But when, as here, that privilege is also the essential qualification for voting in 
a primary to select nominees for a general election, the state makes the action 
of the party the action of the state. 
230 Smith, supra note 6, at 49. 
2" See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (finding poll 
tax unconstitutional under strict scrutiny standard because "wealth or fee paying has • • • 
no relation to voting qualifications"); see also Karlan, supra note 17, at 1709-10, 1709 
n.13 (noting that the "participatory right [to vote] has been implicated by a variety of re-
strictions on franchise, including white primaries, de-annexation, poll taxes and literacy 
tests, durational residency requirements, and, most recently, the power to cast write-in 
votes"). 
25. For details of the use of poll taxes to hinder minority voting, see Alt, supra note 
16, at 356. Poll taxes were established in Alabama, see id. at 38-39; 44; Arkansas, see 
id. at 356; Florida, see id. at 356; Louisiana, see id. at 356, 414 n.18; Mississippi, see 
id. at 137, 146, 156; North Carolina, see id. at 158, 356; South Carolina, see id. at 194, 
196, 356; Tennessee, see id. at 356; Texas, see id. at 235, 239; and Virginia, see id. at 
272-73, 274-76, 356. J. Morgan Kousser described the poll tax as the "most effective de-
vice" for restricting black suffrage in Georgia. See KOUSSER, supra note 5, at 210-15 (cit-
ing figures for the 1892, 1894, and 1896 elections, in which the highest rate of black 
turnout was 383% in 1894, while white turnout rate was 68.6% in the same year). 
26. 380 U.S. 528, 540-54 (1965). 
XI. See id. at 540-44. 
28. See id. at 544. 
29. Literacy requirements endured well into the 20th century. See, e.g., Lassiter v. 
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derstanding" tests30 that would disenfranchise the freedmen legally 
while appearing neutral on their face were widespread. "Grandfa-
ther,,31 and "old soldier" c1auses32 made it easier to disenfran-
chise blacks without similarly disenfranchising whites by exempting 
from the application of literacy tests and other voting restrictions 
anyone who had served in the United States or Confederate army 
or navy, their descendants, and anyone who had himself voted, or 
whose father had voted, or whose grandfather had voted before 
January 1, 1867. 
The delegates to the Reconstruction-era state constitutional 
conventions that adopted these measures did not hide their inten-
tions: Virginia Delegate William A. Dunning, for example, re-
marked: 
Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 51 (1959) (holding literacy tests to 
be rationally related to legitimate state interest in ensuring "intelligent use of the ballot"). 
30. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. vm, § 181 (repealed 1965) (literacy and understanding 
clauses). It was not until 1965 that understanding clauses were declared unconstitutional. 
See Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965). Albert Bushnell Hart reported that 
shortly after an enactment of the understanding clause in Virginia, a well-educated Afri-
can-American attempting to resister to vote was asked to take such a test. He was asked, 
"What clauses of the present Virginia constitution are derived from the Magna Carta?" 
The young man replied, "I don't know, unless it is that no negro shall be allowed to 
vote in this commonwealth." See Albert Bushnell Hart, The Realities of Negro Suffrage, 
1906 PROC. OF THE AM. POL. SCI. AsS'N. 149, 162 (copy on file with author). The 
young man was reportedly registered to vote. See id. 
31. See Schmidt, supra note 5, at 846, 854 n.80 (quoting the Oklahoma Supreme 
Court in Atwater v. Hassett, III P. 802, 812 (1910) ("[T]he presumption follows ••• 
that the virtue and intelligence of the ancestors will be imputed to his [sic] descendants, 
just as the iniquity of the fathers may be visited upon the children unto the third and 
fourth generation.',). Oklahoma had amended its constitution to incorporate a grandfather 
clause, but the United States Supreme Court ruled that the clause was unconstitutional be-
cause it perpetuated "the very conditions which the [Fifteenth] Amendment was intended 
to destroy." Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 360 (1915). Similarly, in Lane v. Wil-
son, 307 U.S. 268 (1939), the Court invalidated a reenacted grandfather clause, holding 
that the FIfteenth Amendment nullified "sophisticated as well as simple-minded modes of 
discrimination • • . [and] hits onerous procedural requirements which effectively haridicap 
exercise of the franchise by the colored race although the abstract right to vote may re-
main unrestricted as to race." Id. at 275. 
32. See Schmidt, supra note 5, at 846 ('''Old Soldier's Qause' [provides that] those 
who had fought in the Civil War or certain earlier wars, and their lawful descendants, 
could register without meeting literacy and property requirements."). For a detailed history 
and analysis of the evolution and effect of such devices, see id. at 845-81. A candidate 
in the 1905-06 Georgia gubernatorial race argued that without a grandfather clause, the 
literacy and understanding clauses would allow 93,000 educated blacks to vote while 
"keep[ing] out the votes of many an old democratic hero who was too busy shedding his 
blood in defense of Georgia to learn readin', 'ritin', and 'rithmetic." Russell Korobkin, 
The Politics of Disenfranchisement in Georgia, 74 GEORGIA H1ST. Q. 296, 326 (1990) 
(copy on file with author). 
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I do not expect [the understanding test] to be administered 
with any degree of friendship . . . to the suffrage of the 
black man. I expect the examination with which the black 
man will be confronted to be inspired by the same spirit 
that inspires every man upon this floor and in this conven-
tion.! would not expect an impartial administration of the 
clause.33 
Warming to this theme, he added: 
The people of Virginia do not stand impartially between 
the suffrage of the white man and the suffrage of the black 
man. If they did, the upperm,ost thoughts in the hearts of 
every man within the sound of my voice would not be to 
fmd a way of disenfranchising the black man and enfran-
chising the white man. We do not come here prompted by 
an impartial purpose in reference to Negro suffrage.34 
The Virginia convention also adopted selective disenfranchisement 
of convicted felons as a further means of reducing black electoral 
participation.3s These Reconstruction electoral qualifications were 
remarkably effective. By 1910, registered voters among the freed-
men dropped to 15% in Virginia, and under 2% in both Alabama 
and Mississippi.36 
33. VIRGINIA PROCEEDINGS, supra note 5, at 2972 (statement of delegate William A. 
Dunning). The literacy test was one of the more effective tools for disenfranchising the 
freedmen, for: 
Given the legacy of slavery and the meager support for black schools in the 
aftermath of Reconstruction, illiteracy among blacks was widespread. In 1890 
more than half of the adult black males in the South could not read, and many 
others were barely literate. Fairly administered, literacy tests (which required 
perspective voters to prove that they could read a provision of the state or 
federal constitution) would deny the ballot to most black men; applied by parti-
san white officials who were bitterly opposed to black suffrage, they would cut 
even further into the black electorate. 
NIEMAN, supra note 13, at 106. 
3.(. VIRGINIA PROCEEDINGS, supra note 5, at 2972 (statement of delegate William A. 
Dunning). 
35. See Note, The Need for Reform of Ex-Felon Disenfranchisement Laws, 83 YALE. 
LJ. 580, 582-84 (1974); Andrew L. Shapiro, Note, Challenging Criminal Disenfranchise-
ment Under the Voting Rights Act: A New Strategy, 103 YALE LJ. 537 (1993) (discuss-
ing racially motivated disenfranchisement laws). 
36. See NIEMAN, supra note 13, at 107. 
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2. Felon Disenfranchisement Laws: Jim Crow's Last Hurrah 
"Everybody knows that this Convention has done its best to 
disfranchise the negro." 
William A. Dunning, Delegate, Virginia Convention37 
During Reconstruction, white factions pressing for disenfran-
chisement denounced blacks as "ignorant, lazy, criminally inclined 
and venal, a race demonstrably unqualified to exercise [the fran-
chise].,,38 In an effort to prevent African-Americans from voting, 
several states enacted felon disenfranchisement laws and "carefully 
selected disenfranchising crimes in order to disqualify a dispropor-
tionate number of black voters.,,39 The racially discriminatory 
roots of felon disenfranchisement and the effect of these laws on 
minority vote dilution are seldom considered,40 but many of to-
day's laws disenfranchising felons can trace their roots to attempts 
by Reconstruction constitutional conventions to enact laws that 
would keep black voters out of the electoral process.41 The laws 
disqualifying felons have been the most enduring enactments of the 
Reconstruction era when states "carefully selected disfranchising 
crimes in order to disqualify a disproportionate number of black 
37. See 2 OFFlCIAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTlTUTlONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE 
OF ALABAMA, MAy 21, 1901, TO SEPT. 3D, 1901, at 4782 (1901) [hereinafter ALABAMA 
PROCEEDINGS] (statement of Alabama delegate Freeman). 
38. NIEMAN, supra note 13, at 108. 
39. Ex-Offenders' Voting Rights: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil liber-
ties, and the Admin. of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 11 
(1974) [hereinafter Voting Rights Hearings] (testimony of John A. Buggs, Staff Director, 
United States Commission on Civil Rights). 
40. See, e.g., Fox Butterfield, Many Black Men Barred from Voting, N.Y_ nMES Jan. 
30, 1997, at A-12. 
41. Armand Derfner of the Lawyers' Committee for Civil rights Under Law noted that 
"disqualifying voters for criminal convictions," • . . "like the poll tax, is an ancient tradi-
tion, but it has often been used to discriminate against blacks, as several Southern states 
did in the post-Reconstruction period by adding crimes like petit larceny to the list of 
disqualifying crimes." Derfner, supra note 16, at 571 & n.213. These provisions have 
been widely reported and discussed. See, e.g., PAUL LEwlNSON, RACE, CLAss, AND PAR-
TY: A HISTORY OF NEGRO SUFFRAGE AND WHITE Pouncs IN THE SOUTH 84-86 (1932) 
(discussing explicit racism at state constitutional conventions); Harvey, supra note 3, at 
1146 & n.6 (1994) (listing statutes); id. at 1177-81 (analyzing the significance of Voting 
Rights Act in assessing minority vote-dilution claims in light of felon disenfranchisement); 
Shapiro, supra note 35, at 537-42 (collecting statutes). For exhaustive statistical research 
and interpretation, see generally C. VANN WOODWARD, ORIGINS OF THE NEW SOUTH 
1877-1913 (1951). 
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voters.'>42 The Alabama Constitution of 1875 disenfranchised 
"[t]hose who shall have been convicted of treason, embezzlement 
of public funds, malfeasance in office, larceny, bribery, or other 
crime punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary .'>43 As of 
1901, section 181 of the Alabama Constitution was amended to 
disenfranchise anyone unable to "read and write any article of the 
Constitution of the United States in the English language't44 as 
well as anyone who had not "worked or been regularly engaged in 
some lawful employment, business, or occupation, trade, or calling, 
for the greater part of twelve months next proceeding the time they 
offer to register.'t4S However. anyone failing to meet these stan-
dards could still vote if he was: 
The owner in good faith in his own right, or the husband 
of a woman who is the owner in good faith in her own 
right, of forty acres of land situate in this state, upon 
which they reside, [or] ... assessed for taxation at the 
bale of three hundred dollars or more, [provided the taxes 
were either paid or legal contested.46 
Delegate John B. Knox, later President of the Alabama Consti-
tutional Convention of 1901, announced that the Alabama 
convention's goal was "to establish white supremacy . . . within 
~ Voting Rights Hearings, supra note 39 (testimony of John A. Buggs, Staff Direc-
tor, United States Comm'n on Civil Rights). 
43. ALA. CON5r. OF 1875, art. VIII, § 3. 
oC4. ALA. CoN5r. OF 1901, art. Vll, § 181. Delaware still retains the provision "that no 
person • • • shall have the right to vote unless he shall be able to read this Constitution 
in the English language and write his name." DEL. CoN5r. OF 1897, art. V., § 2. 
43. ALA. CoN5r. OF 1901, art. VIII, § 181. . 
46. A man who met the above requirements was still disenfranchised if he was dis-
qualified when the constitution was ratified, or if he was later convicted of: 
[T]reason, murder, arson, embezzlement, malfeasance in office, larceny, receiving 
stolen property, obtaining property or money under false pretenses, perjury, 
subornation of perjury, robbery, assault with intent to rob, burglary, forgery, 
bribery, assault and battery on the wife, bigamy, living in adultery, sodomy, 
incest, rape, miscegenation, crime against nature, or any crime punishable by 
imprisonment in the penitentiary, or of any infamous crime or crime involving 
moral turpitude; also any person who shall be convicted as a vagrant or tramp, 
or of selling or offering to sell his vote or the vote of another, or of buying 
or offering to buy the vote of another, or of making or offering to make a 
false return in any election by the people or in any primary election to procure 
the nomination or election of any person to any office or of suborning any 
witness or registrar to secure the registration of any person as an elector. 
ALA. CoN5r. OF 1901, art. VIII, § 182. 
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the limits imposed by the Federal Constitution.'>41 John Fielding 
Bums, who drafted the Alabama constitutional felon-disenfranchise-
ment provision, "estimated the crime of wife-beating alone would 
disqualify sixty percent of the Negroes.',48 So-called "robust" 
crimes,49 including murder, which the legislators believed equally 
likely to be committed by whites,50 were missing from the list of 
crimes precipitating disenfranchisement, 51 yet, in Alabama, pre-
venting another person from voting was only a misdemeanor.52 
In United States v. Mississippi,53 the Supreme Court found 
that as of 1890, African-Americans outnumbered whites in Missis-
sippi, but that the literacy, grandfather, and white primary provi-
sions of the 1890 Mississippi convention "worked so well in keep-
ing Negroes from voting ... that by 1899 the percentage of quali-
fied voters in the State who were Negroes had declined from over 
50% to about 9%, and by 1954 only about 5% of the Negroes of 
voting age' in Mississippi were registered.,,54 The Court was per-
suaded in part by the plaintiffs' statistical evidence showing, for 
.-t. ALABAMA PROCEEDINGS, supra note 37, at 7-8 (1901). 
4S. Shapiro, supra note 35, at 541 (quoting Jimmie Frank Gross, Alabama Politics and 
the Negro 244 (1969) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Georgia) (on file with 
author». 
49. Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.s. 213, 266-67 (1898) (citing the Mississippi Su-
preme Court's findings distinguishing between "robust" crimes likely to be committed by 
whites, and "furtive" offenses more likely to be committed by African-Americans). 
so. See MALcOM COOK McMILLAN, CONSTlTUI10NAL DEVELOPMENT IN ALABAMA, 
1798-1901: A STUDY IN POUTICS, THE NEGRO, AND SECI10NALlSM 275 & n.76 (1955) 
("Most of the crimes contained in the report of the suffrage committee [of the Alabama 
Constitutional Convention] came from an ordinance by John Fielding Bums, a Black Belt 
planter. The crimes he listed were those he had taken cognizance of for years in his jus-
tice of the peace court ... where nearly all his cases involved Negros."). 
SI. See Shapiro, supra, note 35, at 541 ("Mississippi's 1890 constitutional convention, 
which became a model for other states, replaced an 1869 constitutional provision disen-
franchising citizens convicted of 'any crime' with a narrower section disenfranchising only 
those convicted of certain crimes, which blacks were supposedly more likely than whites 
to commit."), see also Ratliff v. Beale, 20 So. 865 (1896) (rmding that blacks were more 
likely than whites to commit the enumerated crimes). 
S2. See JIMMIE FRANK GROSS, ALABAMA POUTICS AND THE NEGRO, 1874-1901, at 65-
66 (1969). 
S3. 380 U.S. 128 (1965) (holding that the State of Mississippi, for three quarters of a 
century, systematically designed discriminatory constitutional provisions, statutes, and regu-
lations to keep the number of black voters as low as possible). 
so. See id. at 132; see also W. Roy Smith, Negro Suffrage in the South, in STUDIES 
IN SOUTIIERN HISTORY AND POUTICS 231, 242 (1914) ('"There was a general feeling, in 
the North as well as in the South, that if the negro was to be excluded from his political 
privileges in any case it would be better for all concerned to have it done legally rather 
than illegally.,,). 
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example, that Amite County, Mississippi (whose registrar was a 
defendant), had a white voting age population of 4449, of whom 
3295 were registered to vote, while only one of the 2560 voting 
age African-Americans was registered.55 The Mississippi Supreme 
Court. had held that 
By reason of its previous condition of servitude and depen-
dence, this race had acquired or accentuated certain particu-
larities of habit, of temperament and of character, which 
clearly distinguished it as a race from that of the 
whites,-a patient, docile people, but careless, landless, and 
migratory within narrow limits, without forethought, and its 
criminal members given rather to furtive offenses than to 
the robust crimes of the whites. Restrained by the federal 
constitution from discriminating against the negro race, the 
convention discriminated against its characteristics and the 
offenses to which its weaker members were prone.56 
In enacting felon disenfranchisement provisions, the Mississippi 
constitutional convention of 1890 "paved the way for wholesale 
exclusion of the negroes on perfectly legal grounds . . . The ulti-
mate ideal, of course, was to exclude all negroes and no 
whites."S7 The delegates from the white counties were reportedly 
55. See United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. at 144. In Williams v. Mississippi, an 
African-American defendant indicted by an all-white grand jury and convicted by an all-
white jury challenged his conviction on the grounds that the jury pool was limited to reg-
istered voters, and that the African-American community had been deliberately disenfran-
chised by the Mississippi constitutional convention. 170 U.S. 213, 214-15 (1898). The Su-
preme Court acknowledged the Mississippi Supreme Court's finding that the 1890 conven-
tion had "swept the circle of expedients to obstruct the exercise of the franchise by the 
negro race," id. at 222, but held that nothing in the United States Constitution prohibits a 
state from taking advantage of "the alleged characteristics of the negro race." Id. at 222. 
These efforts at legal disenfranchisement proved successful. See also Franklin, supra note 
5, at 247 ("By 1910 the white supremacists could rest much more comfortably than they 
did in 1890. Every fonner Confederate state had strengthened its stand against Negro vot-
ing by 'legally' disenfranchising Negroes. There seemed to be nothing that anyone could 
do about it."). 
~ RaJliff, 20 So. at 868 (emphasis added). The court added: "Burglary, theft, arson, 
and obtaining money under false pretenses were declared to be disqualifications, while 
robbery and murder and other crimes in which violence was the principal ingredient were 
not." Id. For a detailed discussion of Ratliff, see JOHN L. LoVE, THE DISFRANClllSEMENT 
OF nm NEGRO 20 (1899) (copy on file with author) (describing the Mississippi SupI:Cme 
Court's findings as "[t]he most remarkable judicial utterance since the famous Dred Scott 
decision.,,); Shapiro, supra note 35, at 541 (discussing RatlijJ). 
57. LoVE, supra note 56, at 15. Albert Bushnell Hart, writing near the time of the 
events, observed: 
742 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:727 
suspicious that disenfranchisement provisions would eliminate much 
of .the white constituency as well.58 Finally, a satisfactory combi-
nation of qualifications was reached including disenfranchisement 
for conviction of a crime. One observer called attention to the fact 
that 
The crimes mentioned as disqualifying [a person] from 
voting are such as it is always easy, when desirable, to 
convict the Negro of committing. Under the present method 
of administering justice in the states where these disenfran-
chising constitutions operate, the Negro has neither any 
guarantee of a fair and impartial trial nor any protection 
against malicious prosecution or false accusations when it 
is convenient to convict him.59 
Historian J. Morgan Kousser, who testified as an expert witness 
in Hunter v. Underwood, supported the view that felon disenfran-
chisement laws were specifically intended to serve as insurance if 
courts struck down more blatantly unconstitutional clauses.60 
The disenfranchisement of felons in South Carolina quickly 
followed suit. 61 As in Mississippi, the convention adopted a felon 
disenfranchisement provision excluding persons "who were invari-
ably Negroes, convicted of a specified list of crimes.'t62 The result 
With a view to cut down negro suffrage • • • [t]he disqualification for crime 
have also been somewhat enlarged and possibly a penalty involving disfran-
chisement is sometimes affixed by judges upon a negro which would not be 
assigned to a white man. 
The important thing to remember in this process is that as a matter 
of fact the negro vote has been suppressed • • • There is hardly room for dis-
cussion with our Southern brethren as to whether they mean or expect to take 
away negro suffrage-they have done so practically. 
Hart, supra note 30, at 159-60. The South Carolina provisions were so complex that their 
author told Hart that he himself had failed to follow them correctly and had lost his own 
vote in the election follOwing their enactment. Id. at 163; see also Alt, supra note 16, at 
354-55 (discussing how Mississippi's "Magnolia formula" for disenfranchising African-
Americans was copied throughout the former Confederacy). 
58. See Franklin, supra note 5, at 244. 
59. See LoVE, supra note 56, at 16. 
60. See J. Morgan Kousser, The Undermining of the First Reconstruction: Lessons for 
the Second, in MINORfIY VOTE Dn.unON 27 (Chandler Davidson ed., 1984); Shapiro, 
supra note 35, at 537 (reviewing Kousser's statistics). 
61. See Franklin, supra note 5, at 244 ("In order to write a fundamental law that 
would disfranchise all Negroes and, at the same time, permit every white person however 
ignorant or poor, to vote, Ben Tillman left his seat in the United States Senate to serve 
as chairman of the convention's suffrage committee."). 
62. Id. at 245. 
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was predictable: In 1868, South Carolina saw eleven freedmen 
elected to the state Senate and 82 to the state House; in 1896, no 
freedmen were elected to the state Senate, and only one was voted 
into the state House.63 
Similar developments occurred in other states. Louisiana's 
minority vote declined from more than 130,000 voting in 1896 to 
5,320 registered in 1900, two years after enactment of the Recon-
struction constitution.64 This number dropped to 1,342 by 1904.65 
After Alabama enacted its disenfranchising constitution in 1900, a 
mere 3,000 of 180,000 African-Americans were, registered to 
vote.66 Despite the infamous Black Codes,67 Mississippi in 1867 
had nearly 70% of the eligible African-American population regis-
tered. This number declined to less than 6% within two years of 
the enactment of disenfranchising laws at the state's 1890 constitu-
tional convention.68 
Felony disenfranchisement laws still exist in many states, and 
still effectively deny voting rights to many minorities, despite their 
facial neutrality.69 
63. See Tindall, supra note 10, at 216 tbl. 
601. See Schmidt, supra note 5, at 847 (citing figures compiled by WOODWARD, supra 
note 4, at 56, 68); see also Derfner, supra note 16, at 542. 
65. See Schmidt, supra note 5, at 842 (citing Woodward's statistics). 
66. See id.; see also GROSS, supra note 52, at 274. 
fiT. For a detailed history of Reconstruction and the Black Codes, see generally W.E.B. 
Du BOIS, supra note 15. See also The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 70 
(1872): 
Among the first acts of legislation adopted by several of the States • • • were 
laws which imposed upon the colored race onerous disabilities and burdens, and 
curtaiIed their rights in the pursuit of life, liberty, and property to such an 
extent that their freedom was of little value. • • • They were in some States 
forbidden to appear in the towns in any other character than menial servants. 
They were required to reside on and cultivate the soil without the right to 
purchase or own it. They were excluded from many occupations of gain, and 
were not permitted to give testimony in the courts in any case where a white 
man was a party. It was said that their lives were at the mercy of bad men, 
either because the laws for their protection were insufficient or were not en-
forced. 
68. See Shapiro, supra note 35, at 538. Mississippi's efforts to keep blacks from exer-
cising the vote did not stop even upon passage of the Voting Rights Act in 1965. See 
generally FRANK R. PARKER, BLACK VOTES COUNT: POLITICAL EMPoWERMENT IN MISSIS· 
SIPPI AFfER 1965 (1990) (describing the state's efforts to nullify the black vote after the 
Voting Rights Act became law). 
(/}. The effect of these laws on current voting rights will be discussed later in this 
Article. See infra Part llLA. 
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B. The Voting Rights Act: A Temporary High Point 
"{TJhe convention swept the circle of expedients to obstruct 
the exercise of the franchise by the negro race. ,,70 
The Voting Rights Act of 196571 prohibits any "voting quali-
fication . . . which results in a denial . . . of the right . . . to vote 
on account of race or color.'m Enacted to enforc~ the Fifteenth 
Amendment, 73 it has been described as "the most successful piece 
of federal civil rights legislation ever enacted.',74 The Voting 
Rights Act was passed at least in part in response to Wright v. 
Rockefeller,75 in which Latino and African-American voters chal-
lenged a New York County76 congressional districting plan which, 
they alleged, racially segregated districts in violation of the Four-
teenth and Fifteenth Amendments.77 The Wright Court rejected the 
70. Ratliff v. Beale, 20 So. 865, 868 (1896). 
71. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971 to 1973gg-10 (1994). 
72. Id. § 1973(a). The text of this section is set out below, with the 1982 amendments 
indicated with strikeouts for deleted text and brackets surrounding added text 
No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or pro-
cedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision fit 
6efty- [which results in a denial] or abridge[ment of] the right of any citizen of 
the United States to vote on account of race or color[, or in contravention of 
the guarantees set forth in section 1973b(f)(2) of this title, as provided in sub-
section (b) of this section.] 
[(b) A violation of subsection (a) is established if, based on the 
totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to 
nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open 
to participation by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection 
(a) . . . in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the 
electorate to participate in the political process· and to elect representatives of 
their choice. The extent to which members of a protected class have been 
elected to office in the State or political subdivision is one circumstance which 
may be considered: Provided, That nothing in this section establishes a right to 
have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion 
in the population . • . ]. 
73. Congressional authority to establish the requirements of the Voting Rights Act derives 
from U.S. Const. amend. XV, § 2, which provides: "The Congress shall have power to 
enforce this article by appropriate legislation." See South Carolina v. Katzenbacb, 383 U.S. 
301, 337 (1966) (upholding the Voting Rights Act as a legitimate exercise of congressional 
power under the Fifteenth Amendment). 
74. Drew S. Days ill, Section 5 and the Role o/the Justice Department, in CONTROVERSIES IN 
MINORITY VOTING: THE VOTING RIGHTS Acr IN PERsPECIlVE 52 (Bernard Grofman & Chandler 
Davidson eds., 1992). 
75. 376 U.S. 52 (1964). 
76. New York County consists of Manhattan Island. 
77. See Wright, 376 U.S. at 54. 
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constitutional challenge, finding that despite evidence "that the New 
York Legislature was motivated by racial considerations or in fact 
drew the districts on racial lines,,,78 plaintiffs had still not proven 
that the legislature's districting was done on the basis of race, 
since the same evidence could support other possible inferences.79 
The Voting Rights Act was in some ways a high point of the 
struggle to breathe life into the minority electoral franchise. Once 
viewed as the culmination of the civil rights movement of the 
1950s and 1960s,80 it faced immediate attack. Advocates of 
"States' rights" immediately challenged its constitutionality, but in 
South Carolina v. Katzenbach,81 the Supreme Court affirmed its. 
constitutionality.82 
The 1965 passage of the Voting Rights Act was intended to 
address both direct and indirect obstacles to minority voting, such 
as those at issue in Wright, but racial "bloc" voting by whites 
tended to defeat black candidates except in districts where minority 
voters predominated.83 White incumbents quickly moved to re-
structure precincts into multi-member districts from which candi-
dates were elected "at large," thus diluting the effect of the minori-
ty vote by consistently defeating the minority-preferred candi-
date.84 
78. Id. at 56. 
79. See ide at 56-58. In White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 759 (1973), plaintiffs chal· 
lenged a Texas redistricting plan on the grounds that the plan created "impennissible devi-
ations from population equality," and that the multi-member districts it created 
impennissibly diluted minority voting power. The Court rejected the "impennissible devia-
tion" claim. See ide at 764. It held, however, that the multi-member district did violate 
the Fourteenth Amendment by impennissibly diluting the voting strength of the racial mi-
norities in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. See ide at 769-70. 
so. See Leroy D. Clark, The Future Civil Rights Agerula: Speculation on Litigation, 
Legislation, and Organization, 38 CATH. U. L. REv. 795, 830 n.182 (1989). 
81. South Carolina V. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966). 
82. See ide at 337 (''This may have been an uncommon exercise of congressional power, 
as South Carolina contends, but the Court has recognized that exceptional conditions can 
justify legislative measures not otherwise appropriate.''); ide at 334. 
83. See NIEMAN, supra note 13, at 213. 
M. See id. ("[I]f members were elected at-large, with voters throughout the city casting 
ballots for all five seats, the white majority could preserve a lily-white council.,,). 
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1. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act 
"[Als for the equality, you know us white men will not 
tolerate it." 
W.L. Peck, Populist Candidate 
for Governor, Georgia, 189285 
The Voting Rights Act has two principal provisions. Section 2, 
which forbids imposition or application of any "voting qualification 
or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure . . . by 
any state or political subdivision in a manner which results in a 
denial or abridgement of the right of an citizen of the United 
States to vote on account of race or color,,,86 and § 5, which re-
quires federal approval of changes in voting procedures in areas 
with a history of discrimination. 
According to the legislative history, Congress used the words 
"on account of race or color" in the Act to mean "with respect to" 
race or color, and not to connote any required purpose of racial 
discrimination.87 If there had been any doubt that Congress in-
tended to abolish all voting inequities, these doubts should have 
been laid to rest by the 1982 amendment to § 2.88 By passing the 
85. Korobkin, supra note 32, at 28 (quoting W.L. Peek, Populist candidate for gover-
nor of Georgia, in the Atlanta Constitution, Aug. 23, 1892). 
08. 
86. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1994) Oisting violations contained within the Act). 
87. S. REP. No. 417, at 206 n.109 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 205-
88. Section 2, as amended, provides: 
No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or proce-
dure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a 
manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of 
the United States to vote on account of race or color. . • . A violation of 
subsection (a) . . . is established if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is 
shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State 
or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a 
class of citizens protected by subsection (a) • • • in that its members hav~ less 
opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political 
process and to elect representatives of their choice. The extent to which mem-
bers of a protected class have been elected to office in the State or political 
subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered: Provided, That noth-
ing in this section establishes a right to have members of a protected class 
elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population. 
Voting Rights Act Amends. of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131, 134 (1982) (codi-
fied as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973, 1973(b), 1973(aa)-(la), 1973(aa)-6(a) (1988» 
[hereinafter Voting Rights Act Amends. of 1982]. This section was amended expressly to 
abolish the judge-made intent requirement expressed in Baker v. Carr. 
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amendment, Congress intended to guarantee equal protection of the 
voting laws to all citizens, without any requirement of a showing 
of intent The legislative history indicates that "even a consistently 
applied practice premised on a racially neutral policy would not 
negate a plaintiff's showing through other factors that the chal-
lenged practice denies minorities fair access to the process."S9 In 
what came to be known as the "results" test, amended § 2 bars all 
voting qualifications, standards, practices, or procedures that result 
in a minority group having "less opportunity than other members 
of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect . 
representatives of their choice.'>90 The 1982 "results" test was not 
a radical Congressional invention; the Court itself had applied this 
test in earlier cases to strike down schemes or procedures that had 
resulted in the electoral exclusion of a minority community91 even 
without showing an intent to discriminate.92 Instead of looking for 
invidious purpose, amended § 2 calls for a "totality of the circum-
stances" analysis of the harmful effects of any challenged election 
plan. 
2. Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act 
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act prohibits localities with a 
history of voting discrimination from effectuating any new voting 
procedures, including new districts, without flIst completing 
"preclearance," i.e., obtaining Justice Department or U.S. District 
Court approval of any changes that may have a negative effect on 
the minority community's ability to elect their chosen representa-
tives.93 Section 5 thus attempts to prevent any new forms of indi-
rect discrimination from taking effect, but it does not address pro-
cedures that were in effect when it was enacted.94 This 
"preclearance" provision was initially set to expire after five 
89. S. REP. No. 417, at 206 n.l09 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 171, 205-
08. 
90. Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1988). 
91. See Clark, supra note 80, at 831 & n.183; see also Pleasant Grove v. United 
States, 479 U.S. 462, 464 (1987) (holding that annexation of all-white area to an all 
white city was a "change" in voting practice and procedure subject to Justice Department 
clearance; clearance denied because of history of racial discrimination and city's refusal to 
annex predominantly black neighborhood). 
92. See, e.g., White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973) (explaining vote dilution analysis 
listing evidentiary facIors plaintiffs may use to establish their case). 
93. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c) (1994). For a comprehensive analysis of the provisions and 
operations of § 5, see Derfner, supra note 16, at 576-81. 
94. See NIEMAN, supra note 13, at 215. 
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years,95 but Congress extended its application for five years in 
1970, for seven years in 1975, and for twenty-five years in 
1982.96 
In United Jewish Organizations v. Carey,'TI a plurality of the 
Court held that the Constitution did not prevent a jurisdiction that 
was subject to the Voting Rights Act from deliberately creating or 
maintaining majority-black districts in order to insure that a reap-
portionment plan satisfies the Act. Plaintiffs from Kings County, 
New York, a jurisdiction cover~ under § 5, challenged redistrict-
ing legislation that split the Hasidic Jewish community into two 
districts in order to create significant nonwhite majorities in these 
districts.98 Members of the Hasidic Jewish community sued, alleg-
ing that splitting their community in order to create majority-black 
electoral districts unfairly diluted the Hasidic community's voting 
power. A plurality of the Supreme Court affIrmed the district 
court's dismissal of the suit, on the grounds the United States 
Constitution allowed states to create or preserve majority-minority 
districts in order to satisfy the requirements of § 5 of the Voting 
Rights Act. Further, the plurality held that racial criteria could be 
used in districting and apportionment plans, and that their use is 
not limited to plans attempting to remedy past discrimination, af-
fInning the district court's holding that use of race was justified as 
long as the districting "is in conformity with the unchallenged 
directive of and has the approval of the Attorney General," and the 
resulting plan is not "unfairly prejudicial to white[s] or non-
white[s].,,99 Justice Brennan, by contrast, found that race-conscious 
districting could be constitutional when Congress had expressly 
adopted such a remedial policy, as in the Voting Rights Act. lOO 
After several decades of Voting Rights Act litigation, the per-
centage of African-Americans of voting age registered to vote in 
the South, which was approximately 3% in 1940, increased from 
43.3% (22.5% in the Deep South) in 1934 to approximately 
!IS. See id. at 214. 
96. See id. 
97. 430 U.S. 114 (1977). 
98. See id. at 151-52. 
99. Id. at 155. 
100. See id. at 175 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("However the 'Court ultimately decides the 
constitutional legitimacy of 'reverse discrimination' pure and simple, I am convinced that 
the application of the Voting Rights Act substantially minimizes the objections to prefer-
ential treatment, and legitimates the use of even overt, numerical racial devices in elector-
al redistricting.''). 
1998] DISENFRANCHISEMENT OF MINORITY VOTERS 749 
63.7%.101 In addition, the number of minority members elected to 
public office rose noticeably,l02 vividly demonstrating just how 
pressing the need was for the remedies provided by the Voting 
Rights Act 
It is somewhat ironic that without the increase in minority 
voting strength between 1965 and 1980, members of Congress 
would have been far less likely to support the 1982 amend-
ments.103 As it was, however, incumbent minority representatives 
overcame vigorous Reagan administration opposition to pass the 
1982 amendments to the Act, which outlawed any practices, includ-
ing those already in place which, in the totality of circumstances, 
gave the minority electorate less opportunity than other members of 
the electorate to elect representatives of their choice. 104 
C. Dismantling the Voting Rights Act 
Particularly in its amended fonn, the Voting Rights Act had 
great potential for leveling the playing field between majority and 
minority interests, but the Supreme Court's right wing immediately 
began dismantling its key provisions. The present Court's definition 
of equal representation appears to be satisfied simply by ensuring 
each individual fonnal access to the ballot. The effect that the 
system has on the impact and strength of that vote as combined 
with other votes is not considered. IDS 
101. See Chandler Davidson, The Recent Evolution of Voting Rights Law Affecting Ra-
cial and Language Minorities, in Qumr REvOLUTION OF TIlE SOUTII: THE IMPAer OF TIlE 
VOTING RIG1ITS Aer, 1965-1990, supra note 16, at 21, 29-30. Dr. Davidson defines the 
"Deep South" for statistical purposes as Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi and the Carolinas. 
See id. at 30. 
102. See Lisa A. Kelly, Race and Place: Geographic and Transcendent Community in 
the Post-Shaw Era, 49 VAND. L. REv. 227, 239-40 (1996); Steven L. Lapidus, Note, 
Eradicating Racial Discriminotion in Voter Registration: Rights and Remedies under the 
Voting Rights Act Amends of 1982, 52 FORDHAM L. REv. 93, 97 (1983) (summarizing the 
benefits which the Voting Rights Act provides to minorities). 
103. See KOUSSER, supra note 5, at 151 (noting the correlation between expansion of 
the franchise during the "second Reconstruction" and greater support by Southern members 
of Congress from voting rights legislation). 
104. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994); see also NIEMAN, supra note 13, at 217-18 (detailing 
the Reagan administration's vigorous opposition to the amendments, and the battles result-
ing in their enactment). 
lOS. See Voting Rights Act Amends. of 1982, supra note 88; see also Gomez v. 
Watsonville, 863 F.2d 1407 (9th Cir. 1988) (challenges to at-large voting plans by Lati-
nos); Windy Boy v. Big Hom, 647 F. Supp. 1002 (D. Mont 1986) (challenges to at-large 
voting plans by Native-Americans). See generally, Su Sun Bai, Comment, Affirmative Pur-
suit of Political Equality for Asian Pacific Americans: Reclaiming the Voting Rights Act, 
139 U. PA. L. REv. 731 (1991) (focusing on discriminatory barriers that confront non-
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1. Conflating Individual and Community Interests: 
Wesley v. Collins 
In Wesley v. Collins/DO a vote-denial and vote-dilution claim 
based on felon disenfranchisement, the petitioner alleged that 
Tennessee's law disenfranchising him upon acceptance of a guilty 
plea violated the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.107 The 
Court found that the felon disenfranchisement provisionslO8 were 
not motivated by an intent to exclude racial minorities, and denied 
plaintiff's appeal. In so doing, it grafted onto the statutory lan-
guage a new burden of proof of intentional discrimination not 
present in the statute or relevant precedents.109 This set the stage 
for a long line of cases in which individual rights and group rights 
are conflated, to the detriment of both.lIO 
In Wesley, the § 2 violation was not the outright disenfran-
chisement of the particular individuals convicted of the specified 
offenses.lll Rather, the violation was the dilution of the innocent 
minority community's voting strength. It is the group as a whole 
that has the protected rights under § 2, and selective disenfran-
chisement laws that affect the group as a whole, though directed at 
the individual, should logically fit within its framework. IIZ More 
English speaking Asian Pacific-Americans and the effect of vote dilution that has excluded 
them from the political process). 
106. Wesley v. Collins, 605 F. Supp. 802, 807 n.4 (M.D. Tenn. 1985), affd, 791 F.2d 
1255 (6th Cir. 1986). 
107. See id. at 803-04. 
108. See id. at 813. As one observer has commented, "[I]f the Voting Rights Act's re-
sults test had been properly applied, the plaintiffs would not have had to produce evi-
dence of racially discriminatory intent at all." Shapiro, supra note 35, at 552 n.87. 
109. See Wesley, 605 F. Supp. at 807. Congress had explicitly rejected the intent test. 
See Shapiro, supra note 35, at 550 & nn.70-71; if. Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 
237, 250 (1991) (holding that once a school board has complied in good faith with a de-
segregation order and "the vestiges of de jure segregation have been eliminated as far as 
practicable," a school district should be released from an injunction imposing a desegrega-
tion plan). 
110. See Wesley, 605 F. Supp. at 807 n.4. Professor Gotanda has criticized the Court's 
acceptance of the lower court's reasoning: 'The Court considered neither ••. Michigan's 
participation in maintaining de jure segregation nor government policies supporting the es-
tablishment of white-dominated housing in the suburbs as a basis for inter-district relief." 
Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color·blind", 44 STAN. L. REv. I, 45 
n.177 (1991). 
III. See Shapiro, supra note 35, at 553 n.91 (stating that the flaw in this argument is 
that § 2 states that a violation of the Act occurs when a minority group has less opportu-
nity than other groups to participate in the electoral process). 
112. See Voting Rights Hearings, supra note 39, at 16 (Rep. Robert W. Kastenmeier, 
Chair, stating, "[p]ractically this may not now be realizable but I think [votes for prison-
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a propos is the Fifth Circuit view in Presley, which invalidated an 
election in which black voters had been forced to use segregated 
booths if they wanted to participate, despite the fact that it was a 
mathematical impossibility for the excluded voters to have changed 
the outcome. 
Presley v. Etowah County Co';'mission1l3 was not, as the 
Court suggested, a dramatic expansion of § 5 powers. Rather, the 
judicial branch of the government was asked to enforce the execu-
tive branch's exercise of the power established for it by the legisla-
tive branch. Not until Congress empowered the federal executive 
branch to register voters and to use § 5 to block new disenfran-
chising and vote-diluting tactics were African-Americans effectively 
enfranchised.1l4 The Justice Department challenged the Etowah 
County, North Carolina, County Commissions' Common Fund and 
Road Supervision Resolutions as fairly obvious attempts to perpetu-
ate indirectly what had previously been openly achieved: the exclu-· 
sion of Etowah County's black citizens from county governance. 
This is a classic example of a maneuver that does not interfere 
with the minority population's ability to go to the polls and cast a 
vote, but which puts in place sophisticated stratagems to render 
that right is rendered nugatory in terms of affecting outcomes. The 
Court, however, refused to recognize the county's tactic of indirect 
minority disenfranchisement 
There are, of course, potential problems with creating 
"majority-minority" districts. While creating such districts guaran-
tees a voice for an otherwise excluded community, it may also 
have a "ghetto" effect, cutting off both voters and candidates from 
any possible across-the-board coalition forming, and guaranteeing 
that the remaining white districts will dominate the resulting el-
ected body. Additionally, limiting remedies to communities that are 
large enough to constitute majorities in their districts overlooks the 
possibility of influencing outcomes through swing voting. Often 
overlooked, however, is that majority-minority districting only 
comes into consideration when the voice of the minority communi-
ty has been effectively silenced through majority "bloc" voting that 
has consistently defeated the minority community's preferred candi-
dates. 
ers] ought to be the goal eventually if we are interested in a truly universal franchise.''). 
113. 502 U.S. 491, 495-99 (1992). 
114. See Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 156 (1965) (striking down literacy, 
character, and understanding tests as purposefully discriminatory). 
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2. Section 5 and Non-Retrogression: Accepting 
Minimal Compliance 
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It was not until 1976, however, that the Court applied § 5 to a 
redistricting plan. In Beer v. United States,115 upholding the legal-
ity of a redistricting plan that generally improved minority repre-
sentation, though not as much as possible, the Court established the 
"non-retrogression" rule, holding that a plan is acceptable even if it 
does not eliminate vote dilution, so long as it does not lead to an 
actual "retrogression in the position of racial minorities."116 In 
Beer, the city of New Orleans had sued under § 5 for approval of 
a plan to redraw the city council districts. The trial court found the 
proposed redistricting plan valid under the Voting Rights Act, but 
the Supreme Court reversed, fmding that the plan improved minori-
ty electoral influence compared with the former plan. The Supreme 
Court held that minimal compliance with the Voting Rights Act 
was sufficient if the new reapportionment plan would not "lead to 
a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to 
the effective exercise of the franchise.,,117 Thus, the Beer Court 
moved in a small but significant way toward undercutting the 
available remedies for minority dilution. The "non-retrogression" 
principle was, in a sense, the foot in the door for the Rehnquist 
Court's color-blind jurisprudence and the subsequent death of mi-
nority voting rights. 
II. DISMANTLING EQUAL PROTECI10N: INNOCENCE AND 
INTENTIONAL HARM 
"I take a dim view of this pathological search for discrimi-
nation. It is about time the Court faced the fact that the 
white people of the South don't like the colored people." 
William Rehnquist, Now Chief Justicel18 
The prevalence of tactics expressly intended to prevent the 
freedmen from exercising their newly-acquired rights was one 
reason for passage of the Equal Protection Clause. On May 23, 
lIS. 425 U.S. 130 (1976). 
116. Id. at 141. 
117. See id. 
118. Memorandum from William Rehnquist, in HARRy S. AsHMORE, CML RIGHTS AND 
WRONGS: A MEMOIR OF RACE AND POUTICS 1944-1994, at 342 (1994). 
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1866, Senator Jacob Howard explained the language of the equal 
protection clause, saying: 
This abolishes all class legislation in the States and does 
away with the injustice of subjecting one caste of persons 
to a code not applicable to another. It prohibits the hanging 
of a black man for a crime for which the white man is not 
to be hanged. It protects the black man in his fundamental 
rights as a citizen with the same shield which it throws 
over the white man. Is it not time, Mr. President, the we 
extend to the black man, I had almost called it the poor 
privilege of the equal protection of the law? Ought not the 
time to be now passed when one measure of justice is to 
be meted out to a member of one caste while another and 
a different measure is meted out to the member of another 
caste, both castes being alike citizens of the United States, 
both bound to obey the same laws, to sustain the burdens 
of the same Government, and both equally responsible to 
justice and to God for the deeds done in the body?119 
Under the first principles of equal protection, racially biased 
application of an otherwise constitutional penalty would seem to 
violate equal protection under the Federal Constitution, and perhaps 
under state constitutional guarantees as well. At a minimum, states 
whose disenfranchisement laws were originally adopted in order to 
disenfranchise minority voters would seem to violate the principle 
of equal protection of the laws. For many years, Supreme Court 
jurisprudence recognized a Fourteenth Amendment collective equal 
'protection right to an undiluted vote for minorities, whether politi-
call20 or racial.121 
In 1964, in what the late Chief Justice Warren regarded as his 
most important opinion,l22 the Supreme Court ruled that individu-
119. Senator Howard, Speech, in 39th Cong. 2766 (1866). 
120. See, e.g., Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 113, 124 (1986) (applying an equal 
protection analysis to political gerrymandering claims, and reversing the district court's 
finding that Indiana's state legislative apportionment did not unconstitutionally dilute Dem-
ocratic votes in the largely Republican state). Concurring in the judgment, Justice 
O'Connor said: "[T]he partisan gerrymandering claims of major political parties raise a 
non justiciable political question that the judiciary should leave to the legislative branch as 
the Framers of the Constitution unquestionably intended." Id. at 144-45 (1986) (O'Connor, 
J., concurring in the judgment). 
121. See, e.g., White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765 (1973) (holding that multimember 
districting used invidiously to dilute minority votes is illegal). 
122. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 560, cited in G. EDWARD WHITE, EARL 
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als have a right to "fair and effective representation." In Reynolds 
v. Simsl23 the Court held that "the Equal Protection Clause guar-
antees the opportunity for equal participation by all voters in the 
election of state legislators.,,124 Reynolds had established the "one 
man, one vote" principle, requiring electoral redistricting each 
decade based on the latest census,l25 and had recognized that the 
"right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free and democratic 
society."I26 Even when there has been little or no net gain or 
loss in population in a particular jurisdiction, redistricting can still 
be required because of shifting populations within the jurisdic-
tion.127 The Reynolds Court held, "the right to vote freely for the 
candidate of one's choice is of the essence of a democratic society, 
and any restrictions on that right strike at the heart of representa-
tive government."I28 
Despite its undeniable impact, Reynolds also has been described 
as a "spectacular failure.,,129 Cynical misapplication of Reynolds' 
"one-man, one-vote" rule has proven to be a powerful tool in the 
cycle from post-Civil War, direct disenfranchisement to post-Cold 
War, indirect disenfranchisement of America's minority communi-
ties, undermining the values embodied in the Voting Rights 
Act.130 The result of all this has been that recently, litigation un-
der the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
has been unsuccessful because of the Court's reading of section 2 
WARREN: A PuBuc LIFE 337 (1982). 
123. 377 u.s. 533 (1964). 
124. Id. at 566. 
125. See id. at 583 ("Decennial reapportionment appears to be a rational approach to 
readjustment of legislative representation in order to take into account population shifts 
and growth."). 
126. Id. at 561-62. 
127. See, e.g., Quilter v. Voinovich, 794 F. Supp. 695, 705-06 (N.D. Ohio 1992) 
(Dowd, J., dissenting) (describing that a 50,000 person gain in the total Ohio popUlation 
of approximately 10 million people stilI required that "the majority of the 1981 configured 
districts in [all] major urban counties had to be reconfigured to meet the population re-
quirements" of the Ohio Constitution); rev'd, 507 U.S. 146 (1993). 
128. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 555. Reynolds relied on Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 
339 (1960) (gerrymandering to exclude minority voters); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 
(1953) (whites-only primaries); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (whites-only pri-
maries); and United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941) (racially motivated electoral 
fraud). 
129. Karlan, supra note 17, at 1705. 
130. See id. at 1708 (One-person, one-vote allows for the invocation of judicial over-
sight but fails to check "partial" interpretations of the act by an increasingly partisan judi-
ciary). 
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of the Fourteenth Amendment. Furthennore, there is no reason to 
believe that the current Court majority will be interested in redress-
ing vote dilution caused by minority disenfranchisement, particular-
ly since disenfranchisement has constitutional authorization under 
the Court's current color-blind scheme.l31 
The current Supreme Court, in its rush to dismantle remedies 
for racial bias, has disregarded original constitutional principles in 
following its own anti-civil rights agenda and turned its back on 
the letter and spirit of this vision of the equal protection of the 
law. The Rehnquist Court's disingenuously color-blind attitude has 
placed the Court of the 1990s squarely at the forefront of 19th 
Century jurisprudence, adopting the rationales that were used to 
strike down the original post-Civil War Civil Rights Statutes.132 
A. The Rise of "Color Blindness" 
The currently fashionable "color-blind" characterization of the 
constitution hails from Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy v. 
Ferguson: 133 
The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this 
country. And so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in edu-
cation, in wealth and in power. . • . But in view of the 
Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this country 
131. See Karlan, supra note 3. As Professor Karlan points out, the Court refused in 
Holder v. Hall to allow a vote dilution challenge to the size of a goveming body under 
§ 2 of the Voting Rights Act because, the Kennedy plurality said, the concept of vote 
dilution requires that there be a "norm with respect to which the fact of dilution may be 
ascertained." Id. at 303 (quoting Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 880 (1994». Justices 
Thomas and Scalia apparently do not recognize the existence of racial vote and in any 
case would not apply the Voting Rights Act to claims of racial vote dilution. See id. at 
309. Professor Karlan notes that the Court has identified no circumstances under which 
the intentional creation of a majority-minority district would survive strict scrutiny. See id. 
at 290; see also Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941, 1973 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
("Strict scrutiny applies to all governmental classifications based on race [and] there is no 
exception for race-based redistricting.j; id. at 1971 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (suggesting 
that strict scrutiny applies "whenever a State, in redistricting, foreordains that one race be 
the majority in a certain number of districts • • • j. 
132. Id. For an in-depth analysis of the Court's "color-blind" jurisprudence in the con-
text of multicultural America, see Eric K. Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis: Race Theory 
and Political Lawyering Practice in Post· Civil Rights America, 95 MICH. L. REv. 821, 
860 (1997) (examining the Court's "color-blind" voting rights jurisprudence beyond the 
context of the black-white paradigm). 
133. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Board of Educ., 
347 U.S. 483 (1954); see Rodney A. Smolla, The Ghosts of Homer Plessy, 12 GA. ST. 
U. L. REV. 1037, 1052-53 (1996) (arguing that Justice Harlan's ideal of abolishing race-
conscious policies is gaining support in the current Supreme Court). 
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no superior, dominant ruling class of citizens. There is no 
caste here. Our Constitution is color-blind [and under the 
majority's holding] there would remain a power in the 
States, by sinister legislation, to interfere with the full 
enjoyment of the blessing of liberty; to regulate civil rights, 
common to all citizens, upon the basis of race; and to 
place in a condition of legal inferiority a large body of 
American citizens.134 
For Justice Harlan, a "color blind" Constitution did not permit 
unequal application of the laws. However, Justice Bradley's Plessy 
majority and their spiritual heirs, the Rehnquist-Scalia majority 
today, have appropriated the phrase, using it to strike down civil 
rights legislation and leave "equality" to the forces of social Dar-
winism. Under this view, minorities are seen as having all the 
rights of other citizens, able to move forward on their own without 
protection from Congress or the courts. 135 The Burger and 
Rehnquist Courts have veered sharply from the original intent of 
the Fourteenth Amendment,136 embarking on a jurisprudence that 
could more aptly be called "blind" rather than "color blind."137 
134. Plessy, 163 u.s. at 559, 563, quoted in AsHMORE, supra note 118, at 343 (1994). 
135. See id. at 343-44. 
136. See Jeanmarie K. Gruben, Note, The Rehnquist Court's Changed Reading of the 
Equal Protection Clause in the Context of Voting Rights, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 1819 
(1997) (questioning the Court's tendency to recognize an Equal Protection violation any-
time that race is found to be a predominant factor in the creation of voting districts). 
137. With the Reagan-Bush era, the United States moved headlong toward what has 
been called "the revival of anti-civil rights sentiment," which came to be expressed in 
terms of the code words "color blindness," or "[t)he idea that standing in society depend-
ed on moral and intellectual fitness[, which) was particularly gratifying for those who had 
risen from humble beginnings." ASHMORE, supra note 118, at 344. In this sense, it is 
interesting to note that in practice and on the Court, Justice Rehnquist opposed desegrega-
tion of schools and public accommodations. See id. Dissenting in Rome v. United States, 
Justice Rehnquist argued against race-conscious remedies for racial discrimination. See 
Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 214 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote in 1979: "My father came to this country when he was 
a teenager. Not only had he never profited from the sweat of any black man's brow, I 
don't think he had ever seen a black man." Antonin Scalia, The Disease as Cure: "In 
Order to Get Beyond Racism, We Must First Take Account of Race", 47 WASH. U. L.Q. 
147, 152 (1979). Justice Scalia works from this image of the "innocent" white to the idea 
that discrimination, if it exists, is intentional wrongdoing by specific wrongdoers, and that 
"innocent" beneficiaries of unfair systems owe nothing to the victims. See Thomas Ross, 
Innocence and Affirmative Action, 43 V AND. L. REv. 297, 298 (1990) (exploring the 
"innocent white victim" argument). But see T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case for Race-
Consciousness, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 1060 (1991) (arguing against color-blindness as a 
judicial position). He therefore draws no distinctions between race-conscious remedies for 
inequalities of opportunity caused by racial discrimination and the invidious use of race-
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1. City of Richmond v. J A. Croson Co. 
One of the most disturbing examples of the Rehnquist Court's 
"color blind" reading of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protec-
tion Clause is City of Richmond v. J A. Croson CO.,138 in which 
Justice O'Connor's plurality found that all governmental programs 
establishing race-based preferences are inherently suspect and sub-
ject to strict scrutiny because of the near-impossibility of distin-
guishing between benign remedial classifications on the one hand, 
and classifications based on "illegitimate notions of racial inferiori-
ty or simple racial politics.,,139 Justice O'Connor added that racial 
classifications may stigmatize those whom the classification was 
supposed to help,14O and expressed concern that affirmative action 
plans may reinforce stereotypes that the subjects of the plan are 
unable to succeed without special protection.141 Finally, she re-
jected a lesser standard of review for remedial race-based classifi-
cations on the grounds that society would never reach equality 
unless all race-based classifications are strictly scrutinized.142 There-
fore, she said, a "watered-down" application of equal protection 
review "effectively assured that race will always be relevant in 
American life.,,143 
Justice O'Connor, frequently the swing vote in 5-4 voting 
rights decisions, followed the conservative line on this issue. Al-
though Croson did not address voting issues, it is a pivotal case in 
the evolution of the Rehnquist Court's "color-blind" rationale. Be-
fore Croson, the Court usually reserved strict scrutiny analysis for 
laws disadvantaging groups that had historically been subjected to 
discrimination. Croson was the first case in which the Supreme 
based discrimination to deny equal opportunities to minorities. See, e.g., Richmond v. l.A. 
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 527 (1989) (Scalia, l., concurring). 
138. 488 U.S. 469 (1989). In Croson, a white contractor challenged the city of 
Richmond's "Minority Business Enterprise" (MBE) ordinance requiring all contractors 
receiving city contracts to award at least thirty percent of the sub-contracted work to one 
or more MBEs. See id. at 477. The contractor argued that the set-aside violated the equal 
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. See id. at 469. 
139. Id. at 493 (explaining that while the city's ordinance empowers minorities, it does 
so at the expense of non-minorities who are precluded from competing for contracts based 
upon their race). 
140. See id. at 493. 
141. See id. at 493-94 (citing University of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 298 
(1978». 
142. See id. at 493. 
143. Id. at 495 (criticizing race-based government policies even where they are imple-
mented for remedial purposes). 
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Court held that any race-based state action is subject to strict scru-
tiny regardless of whether the targeted racial group benefits or 
suffers by the classification. Although this reasoning has been 
derided as equating a welcome mat with a keep out sign, it has 
become the core of the present Court's "color blind" jurisprudence 
and has led to the engrafting of the judge-made requirement of 
intentional wrongdoing before the court will rmd a violation of 
equal protection. 
Concurring in City of Richmond v. l.A. Croson Co, Justice 
Scalia set out the conservative manifesto of non-intervention to 
remedy race-based discrimination, saying, "In my view there is 
only one circumstance in which the States may act by race to 
'undo the effects of past discrimination': where that is necessary to 
eliminate their own maintenance of a system of unlawful racial 
classification."I44 "When we depart from this American principle 
we play with fire, and much more than an occasional DeFunis, 
Johnson, or Croson burnS.,,145 In evoking this image, Justice 
Scalia comes dangerously close to suggesting that resort to mob 
violence is justifiable when an "American principle" is violated. 
Characterizing this implied threat of violence as "an American 
principle" does nothing to justify it on constitutional grounds. 146 
As Professor Gotanda points out, Justice Scalia is not invoking a 
neutral constitutional principle; rather, he is advocating the policy 
view that the costs of providing remedies to African-Americans and 
women may be more than white American men are willing to bear, 
and it is simply bootstrapping on Justice Scalia's part to h; to 
pass a statement of racial policy off as a constitutional princi-
ple.147 The conservative Court majority thus took a major step 
toward undercutting gains minority voters had made in the past 
century, all but eliminating equal protection by refusing to inter-
vene on behalf of a disenfranchised minority population unless 
each member could show personal, intentional discrimination.l48 
Dissenting in a later case, Justice Blackmun again decried the 
Court's Croson decision, saying, "One wonders whether the majori-
ty still believes that race discrimination-or, more accurately, race 
discrimination against nonwhites-is a problem in our society, or 
144. Id. at 524 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
145. Id. at 527 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
146. See Thomas Ross, The Richmond Narratives, 68 TEx. L. REv. 381 (1989). 
147. See Gotanda, supra note llO, at 47. 
148. See id. at 2-3. 
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even remembers that it ever was.,,149 
2. Whitcomb v. Chavis 
In Whitcomb v. Chavis, ISO six plaintiffs brought a Fourteenth 
Amendment challenge to an Indiana system of multi-member 
districting which they alleged diluted the African-American vote in 
Marion County, Indiana. 151 The plaintiffs alleged that the 
districting scheme made possible "serial voting that, in the context 
of a majority voting bloc, will reward a cohesive majority with 
superordinate representation,,,152 by permitting each voter "to vote 
separately on each candidate for office, thereby allowing a voting 
majority to control every seat in an election.,,153 The Whitcomb 
plaintiffs also challenged the constitutionality of multi-member 
districting in general. 154 
The Court refused to hold multi-member districting unconstitu-
tional per se. ISS While it recognized that such systems can dimin-
ish the value of a group's votes within the dominant voting popu-
lation, the Court required the plaintiffs to prove that in their situa-
tion, multi-member districting diluted the quality of representation 
when compared with single-member districting.IS6 The Court rec-
ognized that a minority community's rights are violated if its vot-
ing strength is submerged by the multi-member district, 157 but 
found insufficient evidence of minority vote dilution because the 
plaintiffs had "equal opportunity to participate in and influence the 
selection of candidates and legislators .... "158 Justice White 
seemed to confuse lack· of participation, i.e., exclusion of individu-
als from casting their ballot, with minority vote dilution, i.e., ren-
1<9. Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 662 (1989) (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting) (citing with disapproval Croson). 
ISO. 403 U.S. 124 (1971). 
151. See id. at 128-29. Marion County, Indiana, and the City of Indianapolis fonn a 
consolidated city-county with a unitary government. 
152. Samuel Issacharoff, Polarized Voting and the Political Process: The Transformation 
of Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1833, 1840 (1992). 
153. T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Samuel Issacbaroff, Race and Redistricting: Drawing 
Constitutional Lines after Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 588, 590 (1993). 
154. See Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at 144 (restating voters' claim that multi-member districts 
have "unconstitutional advantages" over small districts or single-member votes). 
155. See id. at 147 (refusing to recognize voters' charge that multi-member districts 
overrepresent their voters). 
156. See id. 
157. See Mary A. Inman, Comment, C.P.R. (Change through Proponional Representa-
tion): Resuscitating a Federal Electoral System, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1991, 1993 (1993). 
158. See Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at 153. 
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dering the casting of ballots by minority voters nugatory by sub-
merging them in districts of conflicting interests. This.is made 
clear by his implication that plaintiffs could help to support their 
dilution claim with proof that African-Americans were unable to 
register, vote, or choose their political party, or that ghetto resi-
dents were "regularly excluded from the slates of both major par-
ties."IS9 What this has to do with proof "that multimember dis-
tricts are being used invidiously to cancel out or minimize the 
voting strength of racial groups" was never explained.l60 
Whitcomb therefore reinforces the impression that the Court will 
enforce voting rights only in terms of a pro forma right to engage 
in the ritual of the ballot box. However, if the concept of a "right 
to vote" is to mean anything, it must be understood to include the 
right to influence outcomes in a significant way. 
3. City of Mobile v. Bolden 
If the quest for equality of voting rights is viewed as a cycle, 
Justice Stewart's plurality opinion in City of Mobile v. Bo/den,161 
requiring plaintiffs to prove invidious purpose,162 is undoubtedly 
an indication of a downturn toward the Plessy Court's acceptance 
of de jure exclusion. The Bolden plaintiffs were a group of black 
voters from Mobile who alleged that the city's at-large voting 
system unfairly diluted the votes of a large, geographically and 
politically distinctive minority group, and that racially polarized 
bloc voting by the white majority consistently defeated minority-
preferred candidates. 163 
Justice Stewart's plurality opinion rejecting plaintiffs' position 
markedly restricted the protection of the Fifteenth Amendment right 
to vote, reading it as guaranteeing no more than the right to partic-
ipate, i.e., to cast a vote. l64 As in Whitcomb, the African-Ameri-
159. Id. at 149-50. 
160. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765-66 (1973) (citing Whitcomb, 403 U.s. at 
141-48). 
161. 446 U.S. 55 (1980). 
162. Id. at 73-74 (requiring that claimants demonstrate a "discriminatory intent" in order 
for a voting system to be invalidated). 
163. See id. at 58 (noting that at-large voting system is followed by thousands of local 
governments throughout the country). 
164. See id. at 64-65 ("The Fifteenth Amendment does not entail the right to have a 
Negro candidate elected. . . • The Amendment prohibits only purposefully discriminatory 
denial or abridgement by government of the freedom to vote 'on account of race, color, 
or previous condition of servitude. 'j. 
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can plaintiffs were able to register and cast their votes "without 
hindrance." The Stewart plurality found that their Fifteenth Amend-
ment right to vote was not implicated by the consistent defeat of 
minority-preferred candidates, which is consistent with Stewart's 
view that Congress cannot constitutionally take race into account, 
even to remedy the results of past illegal discrimination.l65 Addi-
tionally, the plurality ruled that unless plaintiffs can prove inten-
tional discrimination, they have no claim.l66 Thus, Bolden unam-
biguously established invidious purpose not only as the standard 
for Fifteenth Amendment claims, but also for claims under § 2 of 
the Voting Rights Act. Plaintiffs must now prove that the chal-
lenged multi-member district plan was "conceived or operated as 
[a] purposeful devic[e] to further racial discrimination.,,167 
Despite Alabama's appalling history of intentional minority 
disenfranchisement, the Court also ruled that it is not enough to 
show that minority voting strength was diluted: Plaintiffs must 
show that the majority intentionally caused this exclusion. Although 
the Bolden plaintiffs were able to meet this standard upon retrial in 
district court, it is nevertheless true that by requiring plaintiffs to 
prove intentional discrimination in order to establish a violation of 
the Voting Rights Act's vote-dilution provisions, the Bolden Court 
departed from a long line of contrary holdings,l68 and greatly in-
creased the burden on the disenfranchised.169 With Bolden, it thus 
became all but impossible to challenge multimember districts unless 
165. See Minnick v. California Dep't of Corrections, 452 U.S. lOS, 128-29 (1981) 
(Stewart, J., dissenting) ("[B]y making race a relevant criterion ••• the Government im-
plicitly teaches the public that the apportionment of rewards and penalties can legitimately 
be made according to race-rather than according to merit or accountability •••• "); 
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 525 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
166. See Bolden, 446 U.S. at 64-65 (stating that pwposeful discrimination is the linch-
pin requirement for a voter's rights claim under the Fourteenth Amendment); See also 
NIEMAN, supra note 13, at 215. . 
167. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 65-66 (quoting Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 149 
(1971» (reiterating the "purposefulness" requirement for attacking a racially disproportional 
electoral system). 
168. See, e.g., Connor v. Fmch, 431 U.S. 407 (1977); Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1 
(1975); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973); Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 
(1966); Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1965). While Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 
124 (1971) and Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964), had seemed to suggest an 
intent requirement, it was not until Bolden that the Court raised this factor to the level of 
an absolute requirement. Congress amended the Voting Rights Act in 1982, Voting Rights 
Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 2, 96 Stat. 131 (codified at 42 U.S.c. § 1973 
(1982», to re-establish the earlier results test. 
169. See NIEMAN, supra note 13, at 215 (noting that it took plaintiffs nearly two years 
after remand to establish proof of discriminatory intent). 
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the defendants were considerate enough to provide evidence that 
the plan for multimember districts was "conceived or operated" for 
such a use.170 The addition of this intent requirement was a crip-
pling blow to minority voting rights, since the odds of finding 
proof that a particular voting practice was adopted for the express 
purpose of discriminating against minorities have aptly been com-
pared with the odds of fmding the Holy Grail.17l 
As Justice Marshall bitterly noted in his dissent, the Stewart 
plurality's vision of the Fifteenth Amendment's "right to vote 
provide[d] the politically powerless with nothing more than the 
right to cast meaningless ballots.,,172 He warned that the Court 
"cannot expect the victims of discrimination to respect political 
channels of seeking redress,,173 if they are unable to receive ade-
quate representation due to the Court's stringent discriminatory 
standard of proof for a claim of minority vote dilution,174 and 
predicted that the "superficial tranqUility" created by the Bolden 
decision would be "short-lived.,,175 
4. Hunter v. Underwood.176 
Meanwhile, in Alabama, little had changed. The disenfranchis-
ing provisions of the Alabama Constitution retained the bar to 
voting for anyone convicted of any offense "involving moral turpi-
tude," leaving it up to the registrars to interpret this prohibi-
tion.177 The plaintiffs had been barred from voting in Montgom-
ery and Jefferson Counties because of "nonprison" misdemeanor 
170. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 65-66; see also Inman, supra note 157, at 2038 (remarlcing 
that proving the subjective intentions of racist legislators is the "legal equivalent of find-
ing the Holy Grail''). 
171. See Inman, supra note 157, at 2038 (noting that the Court never provided guidance 
as to what would constitute sufficient evidence for a successful claim against a discrimi-
natory electoral system). 
172. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 104 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see Pamela S. Karlan, Undoing 
the Right Thing: Single-Member Offices and the Voting Rights Act, 77 VA. L. REv. 1, 39 
(1991) (stating that the Voting Rights Act was designed to "bring about a radical realign-
ment of political control''). 
173. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 141 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
174. See id. (attacking the stringent "intentional discrimination" standard of proof for 
voters challenging an electoral system). 
175. Id. (cautioning the Court that its failure in Bolden to nullify that discrimination 
would cause victims of discrimination to lose their respect for political channels of re-
dress). 
176. 471 U.S. 222 (1985). 
177. Id. at 223-24. 
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check fraud convictions,178 which Alabama had designated as 
crimes of "moral turpitude.,,179 The plaintiffs alleged that the dis-
enfranchising provisions of section 182 of the Alabama Constitu-
tion had been adopted for the express purpose/80 and had the ex-
press effect, of disproportionately disenfranchising blacks, 181 a 
contention which the Court found to be true, based on what Justice 
Rehnquist tenned substantial evidence.182 
The Court fIrst addressed the plaintiffs' contention that section 
182 was unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal 
Protection Oause, given Alabama's long-standing and well-docu-
mented history of intentional direct and indirect exclusion of mi-
nority voters.183 The Court noted that "proving the motivation be-
hind official action is often. . . problematic,"184 but found that 
the plaintiffs had done so. The Court refused to address the issue 
of whether "intentional disenfranchisement of poor whites would 
qualify as a 'permissible motive, ... 185 saying: 
[l]t is clear that where both impermissible motivation and 
racially discriminatory impact are demonstrated, Arlington 
Heights and Mt. Healthy supply the proper analysis .... 
[A]n additional purpose to discriminate against poor whites 
would not render nugatory the purpose to discriminate 
against all blacks, and it is beyond peradventure that the 
latter was a "but-for" motivation for the enactment of § 
182186 
Underwood made clear that a showing of intentional discrimi-
nation is the sine qua non of an equal protection claim, under 
standards derived from the Court's housing discrimination jurispru-
178. Id. at 224. 
179. Id.; see also ALA. CONST. art. 8, ,§ 182. 
180. See Underwood v. Hunter, 730 F.2d 614 (11th Cir. 1984), afJ'd, 471 U.S. 222 
(1985) (finding that discriminatory intent motivated adoption of this section; therefore it 
violates on account of race the fourteenth amendment as to those convicted of crimes not 
punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary); see also Shapiro, supra note 35, at 547-
48 (discussing the Court's "other crime" analysis in the context of felon disenfranchise-
ment); if. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (invalidating inter-district busing 
where there was no showing of an inter-district violation). 
lSI. See Underwood v. Hunter, 730 F.2d at 616. 
182. See Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. at 227-31. 
183. See id. at 222, 226-27, 229 (citing to testimony of historians, and citing as author-
itative WOODWARD, supra note 41, at 321-22 (1971». 
1M. Id. at 228. 
Iss. Id. at 232. 
186. Id. 
764 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:727 
dence.l87 The Court briefly addressed the question of whether fel-
on disenfranchisement was "excepted from the operation of the 
Equal Protection Clause of § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment by 
the 'other crime' provision of § 2 .... "188 Declining to revisit 
the issue decided in Ramirez, the Court said, "[W]e are confident 
that § 2 was not designed to permit the purposeful racial discrimi-
nation attending the enactment and operation" of the Alabama 
disenfranchising provision, which the Court said otherwise violates 
equal protection.189 Thus, while ruling for the plaintiffs and strik-
ing down the challenged law, Underwood still serves to limit a 
plaintiff's case in any suit challenging franchise stratagems for 
which evidence of intent is not so readily available. 
ill. COMPLETING THE CYCLE: THE DEATH OF VOTING RIGHTS 
"The Negro as a political force has dropped out of con-
sideration. . . ." 
Henry W. Gradyl90 
Justice O'Connor referred to Shaw v. Reno as involving "the 
meaning of the Constitutional 'right' to vote,,,191 and perhaps this 
seemingly simple statement holds the key to present treatment of 
voting rights jurisprudence. Justice O'Connor's inverted commas 
around the word "right" suggest two possible interpretations, both 
disturbing. One possibility is that in her view, the right to vote is 
not a right at all, but merely a "right."I92 Nearly as troubling is 
the alternate interpretation, that the right to vote takes only a single 
form, which in the Court's current jurisprudence seems limited to 
187. See id. at 227-28 (quoting Arlington Heights v. Metro Housing Development Corp., 
429 U.S. 252, 264-65 (1977». 
188. Id. at 233. 
189. Id. (citing 418 U.S. 24 (1974). 
190. HENRy W. GRADY, nm NEW SOUTH 244 (New York, R. Bonner's Sons 1890). 
Professor Franklin commented that, "In his claim regarding the ineffectiveness of the Ne-
gro as a political force Grady was literally wishing the Negro 'as a political force' out of 
the picture." Franklin, supra note 5, at 241 n.l. 
191. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 633 (1993). 
192. See Karlan, supra note 17, at 1709 & n.13; see also James A Gardner, Liberty, 
Community and the Constitutional Structure of Political Influence: A Reconsideration of 
the Right to Vote, 45 U. PA. L REv. 893, 933 (1997) (describing the Court's recent cases 
as demonstrating increasing hostility toward § 2 of the Voting Rights Act "because that 
provision implemented a protective-democracy solution to a problem that the Court defines 
as communitarian"). 
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the mere right to participate in the voting process, i.e., to cast a 
ballot, and to have that ballot counted,193 without consideration of 
the diluting effects of majority bloc voting. 
A. The Crackdown on Minorities: Disproportionate Minority 
Incarceration as Vote Dilution 
Felony disenfranchisement laws still remain in many states, 
effectively blocking access to the polls for minority groups in those 
states. Trends in criminal prosecutions in the waning decades of 
the twentieth century have led to greater and greater percentages of 
the minority population being incarcerated.194 Of a to.tal voting 
age population of 10.4 million black men in the United States, 
approximately 1.46 million have been disqualified from voting 
because of a felony conviction.19S Of these, 950,000 are in pris-
on, on probation, or parole, and more than 500,000 are pennanent-
ly barred by convictions in the 13 states that disenfranchise prison-
ers for life.196 The United States is among the world's most ac-
tive nations in imprisoning its citizens,197 and the racial disparity 
in rates of incarceration is growing. In Baltimore, more than half 
of all black men in their twenties are in prison, on probation, or 
on parole, and in the District of Columbia, the figure is approxi-
mately 40%.198 
The 1997 Sentencing Project report found that by 1994 the 
193. See KarIan, supra note 17, at 1709-10 & n.13. 
19(. See Andrew Hacker, Malign Neglect: The Crackdown on African-Americans, NA-
TION, July 10, 1995, at 45, 46 ("Like welfare, crime has been given a racial coloration. 
Indeed, "black crime" is regarded as different and more fearsome than other forms of 
lawbreaking.''}. Current statistics are available at The Sentencing Project, New Report: 
Americans Behind Bars (visited Mar. 31, 1998) <http://www.sproject.com!press-1.htm> 
(copy on file with the Case Western Reserve Law Review). 
I!IS. See Butterfield, supra note 40, at A12. 
196. See id. ("Felons are prohibited from voting while in prison in 46 states, and 31 of 
them disenfranchise offenders while they are on probation or parole.''}. See also infra 
Appendix B for states which do not disenfranchise or. which make restoration of rights 
automatic or relatively simple. The states that disenfranchise pennanently or which make 
restoration of rights difficult are set out infra Appendix A. See also infra Appendix C for 
state-by-state summary of disenfranchising provisions. For a detailed analysis of state 
restrictions on voting rights, see Note, The Equal Protection Clause As A Limitation on 
the States' Power to Disfranchise Those Convicted of a Crime, 21 RurGERS L. REv. 297-
98 & nn. 14-18 (1967) (collecting statutes); see also Harvey, supra note 3, at 1146-49 
(analyzing continuing impact of disenfranchisement provisions). 
197. See Hacker, supra note 194, at 46 ("Black men occupy more than half the nation's 
cells, and each year finds them accounting for more of the prison population.''). 
198. See id. at 48. 
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disparity in incarceration rates between blacks and whites had risen 
to a ratio of 7.66 blacks for every white in prisons, up from 6.88 
in 1988.199 The so-called "war on drugs," with its law-and-order 
approach has been aptly described as "crackdown on African 
Americans,,,200 and it has been a primary cause in recent years of 
the incarceration of citizens of color in numbers far exceeding their 
percentage of the population.201 African-Americans make up 51 % 
of the 1.1 million inmates in prison, although they only represent 
14% of the nation's population.202 Implementation of the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines in 1987 has resulted in a radical shift in the 
racial balance of those sentenced for crime: before the guidelines, 
whites were 66.3% of those sentenced, African-Americans were 
22.3% and Latinos were 8.5%.203 After the Guidelines took ef-
fect, whites dropped to 44.5% of those sentenced, while African-
Americans and Latinos increased dramatically, to 26.2% and 26.3% 
respectively.204 In the 18 to 25 year old age group, the disparities 
are even more startling: white males sentenced in that age group 
dropped from 56% immediately before implementation of the 
Guidelines to 39.2% after; African-Americans increased from 
27.6% to 29.2%; and Latinos sentenced almost tripled, from 12.4% 
before to 31.6% after Guidelines implementation.20S 
This imbalance in incarceration rates cannot be attributed to a 
disproportionate predilection for crime by minority populations: 
199. See Butterfield, supra nOle 40, at A12. In its report Americans Behind /Jars: A 
Comparison of International Rates of Incarceration, 1995, The Sentencing Project notes 
that the United Stales now has the highest recorded rale of incarceration of any nation in 
the world, surpassing both South Africa and the fonner Soviet Union. See The Sentencing 
Project, supra nole 194; see also Hacker, supra nole 194, at 47 (noting reasons why poor 
blacks committing crimes are more likely to get caught than while or blue-collar crimi-
nals). 
200. Butterfield, supra nole 40, at A12 (citing Sentencing Project Study, Intended and 
Unintended Consequences: State Racial Disparities in Imprisonment). For specific stale 
infonnation, see infra Appendices A-C. 
201. See Butterfield, supra nole 40, at A12 (citing Sentencing Project Study, Intended 
and Unintended Consequences: State Racial Disparities in Imprisonment); see also Harvey, 
supra nole 3, at 1152 tbl.l, 1151-59. (providing statistics and statistical analysis); id. at 
1158 ("44% of black convicted felons are sent to prison, compared to 33% of convicted 
while felons."). 
202. See Butterfield, supra nOle 40, at A-12 (citing Sentencing Project Study, Intended 
and Unintended Consequences: State Racial Disparities in Imprisonment). For specific 
stale infonnation, see infra Appendices A-C. 
203. See Gerald W. Heaney, The Reality of Guidelines Sentencing: No End to Disparity, 
28 AM. CiUM. L. REV. 161, 204 & 204 tbl.5 (1991). 
204. See id. 
205. See id. at 205 & 205 tbJ.6. 
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93% of those convicted of drug offenses in New York State are 
black or Latino and only 6.3% white, despite the fact that "[s]tud-
ies and experience have shown that most people who use and sell' 
drugs in [New York] and the nation are white.,,206 93% of the 
United States African American population is located in 22 states, 
primarily New York, California, and those states in the South and 
Midwest, all of which disenfranchise those convicted of various 
offenses.w 
Some states that disenfranchise for various offenses restore the 
vote once the person has completed the sentence,2°s but most put 
varying degrees of obstacles in the way of ex-prisoners seeking 
reinstatement of their voting rights.209 In some states, persons 
once convicted are disenfranchised for life unless they seek and 
obtain a full pardons or similar extraordinary restoration of their 
voting rights.2IO This stark reality necessarily depletes a minority 
community's voting strength over time by consistently placing a 
greater proportion of minority than majority voters under a voting 
disability at any given time.211 For this reason, the effects of the 
intentional discrimination that originally motivated felon disenfran-
chisement still linger. There are, of course, some states where felon 
disenfranchisement was not adopted for discriminatory reasons, but 
there, too, it operates with discriminatory effect. Testifying before 
the House Judiciary Subcommittee at a hearing on voting rights of 
former prisoners in 1974, John A. Buggs, the Director of the Unit-
ed States Commission on Civil Rights pointed out that, looking at 
the relative conviction rates for whites and nonwhites, "one gets a 
rather shocking idea of how disfranchising prohibitions based on 
felony convictions affect minorities.,,212 Director Buggs added that 
206. Shapiro, supra note 35, at 557 n.112 (citing The Correctional Association of New 
York, Mandatory Sentencing Laws and Drug Offenders in New York State (Feb. 1993) 
(citing figures from the New York State Department of Correctional Services, the National 
Institute on Drug Abuse, and the Legal Action Center». 
207. See Butterfield, supra note 40, at A12 (citing Sentencing Project Study, Intended 
and Unintended Consequences: State Racial Disparities in Imprisonment). See infra Ap-
pendices A-C for specific state information. 
203. See infra Appendices A-C for specific state information. 
209. See infra Appendices A-C for specific state information. 
21D. See Shapiro, supra note 35, at 538-39 & nn.15-16 (collecting statutes). For a more 
detailed description of state disenfranchising provisions, see infra Appendices A-C. 
211. See Butterfield, supra note 40, at A12 (citing Sentencing Project Study, Intended 
and Unintended Consequences: State Racial Disparities in Imprisonment). 
212. Voting Rights Hearings, supra note 39, at 12. Some states disenfranchised even 
misdemeanants. See, e.g., Anderson v. State, 72 Ala. 187 (1882) (holding that under dis-
enfranchisement provisions of Alabama's constitution, art. 8, § 3, a conviction of either 
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"even in those States where the lists of disqualifying crimes were 
not selected with the purpose of disfranchising blacks [the felon 
disenfranchisement laws] established an invidious racial discrimina-
tion against minority citizens.,,213 
B. Richardson v. Ramirez 
Curiously, section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendmenf14 has not 
been applied against states that disenfranchised the freedmen after 
passage of the Fourteenth Amendment.215 In Richardson v. 
Ramirez,216 three parolees brought an equal-protection cliallenge 
to a California law which had disenfranchised them because of 
their convictions of "infamous crime[s].,,217 The California Su-
preme Court held that the law violated equal protection,218 but 
grand or petit larceny disqualifies a citizen from voting). In addition to losing the right to 
vote, a convicted felon may be deprived of employment opportunities, professional licens-
es, and the right to hold office and sit on a jury. See, e.g., IDAHO CONST. art. VI, § 3 
(disqualifying a person convicted of a felony or "confined in prison on conviction of a 
criminaI offense" from voting, serving as a juror, or holding any civil office); Williams v. 
Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213 (1898) (upholding Mississippi law that disqualified from jury 
service anyone disqualified from voting). 
213. Voting Rights Hearings, supra note 39, at 13. 
214. Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides: 
[W]hen the right to vote • • • is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such 
State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in 
any way abridged, except for participation in rebeIIion, or other crime, the basis 
of representation therein shaH be reduced in the proportion which the number 
of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens 
twenty-one years of age in such State. 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. 
21S. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. See GROSS, supra note 52, at 222: 
[B]y 1900, Mississippi, Louisiana, South Carolina, and North Carolina had dis-
franchised the Negro through an assortment of devious legal devices, many of 
which were adopted by Alabama in the Constitution of 1901. Representation in 
Congress from these states had not been denied or reduced, as provided for in 
the Fourteenth amendment 
216. 418 U.S. 24 (1974)." Ramirez foHowed closely on the heels of Fincher v. Scott, 
352 F. Supp. 117, 119 (M.D.N.C. 1972), affd, 411 U.S. 961 (1973) (stating that North 
Carolina may constitutionally continue "historic exclusion" of felons from the franchise 
without regard to whether such exclusion can pass muster under the equal protection 
clause). Cj. Allen v. EIIisor, 664 F.2d 391 (4th Cir. 1981) (stating that South Carolina 
statute disqualifying persons convicted of selected crimes does not violate equal protection 
on its face, and remanding for consideration of plaintiff's claim that the statute was ra-
cially discriminatory, and vacated and remanded the underlying statute was amended), 
vacated, 454 U.S. 807 (1981). 
217. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. at 26-27. 
218. Ramirez v. Brown, 507 P.2d 1345, 1357 (1974), rev'd sub nom. Richardson v. 
Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974). 
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the United States Supreme Court reversed.219 The Ramirez major-
ity held that because the framers of the fourteenth amendment's 
section 2 excepted "participation in a rebellion or other crime,,220 
from the provision reducing representation for seceding states that 
denied blacks the right to vote, disenfranchisement based on a 
state-law conviction must not be a per se section 1 equal protec-
tion violation. The Court said: 
[I]n dealing with voting rights as it does, [§ 1 of the equal 
protection clause] could not have been meant to bar out-
right a form of disenfranchisement which was expressly 
exempted from the less drastic sanction of reduced repre-
sentation which § 2 imposed for other forms of disenfran-
chisement. 221 
Therefore, a divided Court held, laws disenfranchising convicts 
were not subject to the strict scrutiny normally applied to voting 
restrictions.222 As Professor David Shapiro has noted: 
The Court expressly disavowed the argument rejected in 
Reynolds v. Sims that section two is the only part of the 
fourteenth amendment dealing with voting rights. Nor did it 
suggest that a state law relating to voting rights is neces-
sarily valid under the equal protection clause if it imposes 
a restriction widespread at the time the clause was adopt-
ed. . . . The sole basis of the decision was that the explicit 
exemption from the formula in section two precludes judi-
cial invalidation under the equal protection clause of sec-
tion one223 
Justice Marshall, joined in dissent by Justice Brennan, said that 
the majority's holding was based on an "unsound historical analysis 
which already has been rejected by this COurt,,,224 and predicted 
that the Court's holding could lead to disenfranchisement for "se-
duction under proInise of marriage, or conspiracy to operate a 
motor vehicle without a muffler . . . or breaking a water pipe in 
219. See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974). 
220. Ramirez v. Brown, 507 P.2d at 1347. 
221. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. at 55. 
m. See id. 
223. David L. Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist: A Preliminary View, 90 HARv. L. REv. 
293, 303 (1976) (citations omitted). Professor Shapiro strongly criticizes the Rebnquist 
analysis in Richardson v. Ramirez. See id. at 302-04. 
224. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. at 56 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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North Dakota, [or e]ven a jaywalking or traffic convic-
tion .... ,,225 After a detailed analysis of the Court's equal pro-
tection jurisprudence in analyzing state statutes that "selectively dis-
tribute the franchise,,,226 Justice Marshall concluded that because 
voting is a fundamental right, "the Court must determine whether 
the exclusions are necessary to promote a compelling state inter-
est.,,227 He concluded that the state had not met its burden.228 
The Ramirez Court left open the possibility of an equal protec-
tion challenge against disqualifications that are too broadly or 
vaguely defmed, such as "crimes of moral turpitude" or the like. In 
such cases, or in cases in which there is no rational basis for se-
lection of the disqualifying felonies, or where the law is inconsis-
tently applied, the Court suggested that it would fmd an equal 
protection violation in "such a total lack of uniformity,,,229 but 
there is no indication of what set of circumstances would meet this 
test. 
Of course, many non-racial motives have been advanced for 
felon disenfranchisement including the so-called "purity of the 
ballot box,,,230 with the loss of the franchise treated as a badge 
of infamy, indicating the "other" who is unworthy of the rights of 
a citizen.23I Judge Leon Bazile, typified the view that sees the 
ex-felon and people of color as partaking of "otherness" or outsider 
225. Id. at 76 n.24 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Otsuka v. Hite, 414 P.2d 412 
(1966); Gary L. Reback, Note. Disenfranchisement of Ex-fewns: A Reassessment, 25 STAN. 
L. REv. 845, 845-46 (1973) (collecting statutes); id. at 850 (arguing that disenfranchise-
ment of ex-felons violates equal protection»; see also Harvey, supra note 3, at 1161-64 
(discussing Reback's foreshadowing of Marshall's dissent). 
226. Richardson v. Ramirez. 418 U.S. at 77 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
227. Id. at 78 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
228. Id. 
229. Id. at 56 (remanding to state trial court for factual determination). 
230. This catch-phrase apparently first appeared in a Reconstruction-era Alabama case 
challenging felon disenfranchisement, see Washington v. State. 75 Ala. 582 (1884), but it 
has persisted into recent years. See Dillenburg v. Kramer, 469 F.2d 1222, 1224 (9th Cir. 
1972): 
Courts have been hard pressed to defme the state interest served by [felon 
disenfranchisement] laws. • . • Search for modem reasons to sustain old govern-
mental disenfranchisement prerogative has usually ended with a general pro-
nouncement that a state has an interest in preventing persons who have been 
convicted of serious crimes from participating in the electoral process or a 
quasi-metaphysical invocation that the interest is preservation of the ''purity of 
the ballot box." 
231. Washington v. State, 75 Ala. at 585 (holding that one rendered infamous by con-
viction of base offense indicative of great moral turpitude is unfit to exercise the privilege 
of suffrage). 
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status in Loving v. Virginia, when he said: 
Parties [to an interracial marriage are] guilty of a most 
serious crime. . . . Almighty God created the races, white, 
black, yellow, malay, and red, and he placed them on sepa-
rate continents. . . . The fact that he separated the races 
shows that he did not intend for the races to mix. The 
awfulness of the offense [of interracial marriage] is shown 
by the fact ... [that] the code makes the contracting of a 
marriage between a white person and any colored person a 
felony. Conviction of a felony is a serious matter. You lose 
your political rights, and only the government has the 
power to restore them. And as long as you live you will 
be known as a felon. ''The moving finger writes and moves 
on and having writ I Nor all your piety nor all your wit I 
Can change one line of it,,232 
The unsavory facts are that present day felon disenfranchise-
ment has its roots in a mentality that assigned people of color to 
the status of non-person, and that these laws continue to operate 
with discriminatory effect The right to vote is so fundamental to 
our democratic system of government that the denial to any group 
of citizens of the right to vote should raise concerns over the 
system's integrity, especially when that right is disproportionately 
denied to minority voters in a continuation of historic, intentional 
disenfranchisement Unfortunately, with the Supreme Court's recent 
views of equal protection challenges to vote-dilution vehicles, it is 
unlikely that such unfair laws will face invalidation in the near 
future. 
C. "Compactness" and the "Ghetto" Requirement 
Another disturbing trend in the Court's "color blind" 
constitutionalism is the Court's requirement-explicit in some cas-
es, and implicit in others-that before a minority community is 
entitled to representation, minority members must live in geographi-
cally "compact" districts which can be justified on "traditional" 
distracting principles. In other words, to establish a § 2 violation, 
232. Transcript of Record at 8, reproduced in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 app. at 
42 (1967) (the Judge's name is given in the Appendix at 33). Legal historian Paul 
Fmkelman has observed that "since colonial times the legal system has seen color itself 
as a sign of criininality." Paul Fmkelman, The Crime of Color, 67 TUL. L. REv. 2063, 
2064 (1993). 
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plaintiffs must prove that "the minority group . . . is sufficient-
ly ... geographically compact . . . [so that they can form a] ma-
jority-minority district,,233 The paradox, of course, is that the 
"traditional" principles resulted in the systematic defeat of minori-
ty-preferred candidates in the jurisdictions subject to the Voting 
Rights Act. 
1. Thornburg v. Gingles 
In Thornburg v. Gingles,234 a vote-dilution case that originat-
ed in North Carolina, the Court established that while race-based 
vote dilution violated the "results" test, plaintiffs could only obtain 
a remedy against the majority's racially-polarized bloc voting if the 
minority plaintiffs can prove that they live in a geographically 
"compact" area. Justice O'Connor stated plainly: "[E]lectoral suc-
cess has now emerged, under the Court's standard, as the linchpin 
of vote dilution claims, and . . . the elements of a vote dilution 
claim . . . create an entitlement to roughly proportional representa-
tion within the framework of single-member districts.,,23S 
The Gingles plaintiffs challenged the use of at-large elections 
in multi-member districts in North Carolina's state elections, even 
though the plan had been "precleared" by the Justice Department 
The plaintiffs argued that the multi-member districts, from which 
candidates were elected at large (rather than each running from a 
separate district) diluted their votes by submerging them in a white 
majority.236 The Court found that the challenged practice of at-
large voting in multi-member districts in which the white majority 
233. Pamela S. Karlan, Maps and Misreadings: The Role of Geographic Compactness in 
Racial Vote Dilution Litigation, 24 HARv. C.R-C.L. L. REV. 173, 180 (1989); see also 
Kathryn Abrams, "Raising Politics Up": Minority Political Participation and Section 2 of 
the Voting Rights Act, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 449, 476-77 (1988) (considering voting as a 
means of expression and interaction with fellow citizens); Ronald Dworkin, What Is 
Equality? Part 4: Political Equality, 22 U.S.F. L. REV. I, 4 (1987) (arguing that by giv-
ing an individual the right to vote, "[t]he community confinns an individual person's 
membership, as a free and equal citizen"). 
234. 478 U.S. 30, 43 (1986): 
While explaining that "[t]he extent to which members of a protected class have 
been elected to office in the State or political subdivision is one circumstance 
which may be considered" in evaluating an alleged violation, §2(b) cautions 
that "nothing in [§2] establishes a right to have members of a protected class 
elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population." 
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b» (alterations in origina1). 
235. Id. 
236. See Uf. at 46. 
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routinely voted as a bloc to defeat minority-preferred candidates 
"interact[ ed] with social and historical conditions to cause an in-
equality in the opportunities enjoyed by black and white voters to 
elect their preferred representatives.,,237 The Court viewed the 
central issue as whether "as a result of the challenged practice or 
structure, plaintiffs do not have an equal opportunity to participate 
in the political processes and to elect candidates of their 
choice. ,,238 
The Gingles plurality created a three-part test to establish 
illegal dilution of votes by the majority racial group, minority 
plaintiffs first had to show that their group was sufficiently large 
and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-
member district;239 second, that the minority group was politically 
cohesive;240 and third, that· absent special circumstances, white 
majority "bloc voting" usually defeated the minority's chosen can-
didate.241 The Court enumerated factors that could be used to 
meet the three-pronged test, including a history of voting discrimi-
nation and racially polarized bloc voting; the jurisdiction's history 
of using voting practices that disadvantage the minority group;242 
exclusion of minority candidates from slating processes; the extent 
to which minority group members continue to experience the ef-
fects of past discrimination which "hinder their ability to participate 
effectively in the political process,,;243 the use of overt or subtle 
racial appeals in political campaigns; and the extent to which mi-
nority group members have been elected to public office.244 
Gingles was a turning point in the Court's voting rights juris-
prudence for several reasons. It affirmed the right of a minority 
community to be free from vote dilution caused by the majority's 
237. Id. at 47. 
23S. Id. at 44. (citing S. REP. No. 94-417, at 28 (1982), reprinled in 1982 
U.S.C.CAN. 177, 206. 
239. See id. at 50 (noting that in the absence of a large and geographically compact 
group, minority voters would still be unsuccessful in electing their candidates). 
20. See id. at 51 (requiring minority claimants to show that their groups share "distinct 
[political] interests''). 
2(1. See id. at 49-51. 
2(2. See id. at 56-57. The Court gave as examples of such minority-defeating practices 
and procedures extremely large districts, majority vote requirements, and prohibitions 
against "bullet" voting. See id. 
w. Id. at 45 (providing a list of factors which courts should consider in deciding 
whether an electoral system is structured to discriminate against minorities). 
2((. See id. at 45. The Court cited education, employment, and health as areas of dis-
crimination that also could disadvantage a minority group politically. See ia. 
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bloc voting along racial lines.245 It also applied the results test, 
treating vote dilution as including more than intentional violations. 
This appears to be a shift away from the line of cases requiring 
proof of intentional discrimination.246 Nevertheless, Gingles has 
been criticized for curtailing the scope of the results test and for 
having led to a "mechanistic application" of its formula.247 
Gingles can also be seen as the point at which the Court began 
moving toward what can be called a "ghetto" requirement To 
show that the "legislative decision to employ multimember, rather 
than single-member, districts ... dilute[d] their votes by submerg-
ing them in a white majority,,,248 the plaintiffs had to prove that 
they likely would succeed if single-member districts were created. 
In effect, the Court said that the ability of a minority group to 
form a single-member district was the baseline for proving a vote-
dilution violation of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act249 The Court 
thus mixed its preferred remedy-the majority-minority dis-
trict-into the determination of whether vote dilution had occurred. 
This was a nearly unnoticed, but major, move toward the ghetto 
requirement with a stroke of the pen, the Court limited voting 
rights remedies to residents of geographically compact minority 
enclaves, or, in other words, ghettos. 
Gingles did not address the concerns of other politically cohe-
sive minority voters whose preferred candidates are usually defeat-
ed by white majority bloc voting.2S0 Although these three precon-
ditions provide a judicially manageable standard for defIning mi-
nority vote dilution, a judicially manageable standard-as demon-
strated in the one person, one vote area--constricts the Court's 
2<S. See Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1994) ("No voting qual-
ification or prerequisite to voting • • • shall be imposed or applied by any State or politi-
cal subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any 
citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color."). 
246. Section 2(b) of the Voting Rights Act establishes that a violation exists where the 
"totality· of circumstances" reveals that "the political processes leading to nomination or 
election . • . are not equally open to participation by members of a [protected class] • • . 
in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to partici-
pate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice." 42 U.S.C. § 
1973(b) (1994). 
247. See Inman, supra note 157, at 2049-50 (suggesting that the Court sacrificed its vi-
sion of "fair representation" for a judicially manageable standard for evaluating the merits 
of vote dilution claims). 
248. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 46. 
249. See id. 
250. See id. at 52-61. 
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vision of fair representation. Gingles was a major step toward the 
judicially-created requirement that minority voters form geographi-
cally compact ghettos,251 justifiable on "traditional" districting 
grounds. The Gingles plurality acknowledged this fact without truly 
addressing it, commenting: 
We have no occasion to consider whether § 2 permits, and 
if it does, what standards should pertain to, a claim brought 
by a minority group, that is not sufficiently large and com-
pact to constitute a majority in a single-member district, 
alleging that -the use of a multimember district impairs its 
ability to influence elections.252 
In other words, a minority community that is too small, or not 
geographically adjoining another minority community with which to 
form a majority in a single-member district, has no remedy under 
Gingles even if it can prove that its preferred candidates are sys-
tematically defeated by race-based bloc voting of the majority in 
which they are submerged.253 
2. Shaw v. Reno 
In Shaw v. Reno,254 the Court applied its "color-blind" Croso-
n rationale to electoral redistricting and moved dramatically closer 
to indirect de jure disenfranchisement. Shaw arose from the 1990 
census figures which showed that North Carolina was entitled to an 
additional congressional district.25s The first proposed reapportion-
ment plan provided for one majority-African-American congressio-
nal district, but this plan failed to win § 5 "preclearance.,,256 The 
North Carolina legislature then submitted a plan providing for two 
151. See id. at 46; see also Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson, Postscript: What is 
the Best Route to a Color-Blind Society?, in CONTROVERSIES IN MiNORITY VOTING: nm 
VOTING RIGlITS Acr IN PERsPECTIVE 312 (Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson eds., 
1992) (stating that ''political ghettoization" concentrates black voters "in a handful of ma-
jority-black districts, with little or no influence in the remaining districts"); Christopher 
Eisgruber, Ethnic Segregation by Religion and Race: Reflections on Kiryas Joel and Shaw 
v. Reno, 26 CUMB. L. REv. 515 (1996); Inman, supra note 157, at 2051 (identifying the 
core value underlying Gingles' three preconditions as a right to proportional representa-
tion-but only for compact, cohesive, and sizable minority groups). 
152. 478 U.S. at 46 n.12 (emphasis added). 
153. See id. at 90 (O'Counor, J., concurring) (stating that the majority's reasoning 
means that minority groups must be "large," "geographically concentrated," or "cohesive" 
in order to present a successful claim). 
2S4. 509 U.S. 630 (1993). 
15S. See id. at 635-36. 
2S6. See id. 
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majority-minority congressional districts, and the United States 
Attorney General approved the revised plan.257 
White North Carolinians challenged the allocation of a second 
majority-minority district, arguing that one of the minority districts 
had such a bizarre shape that it should be struck down under the 
Fourteenth Amendment because it could only have been designed 
as a race-based gerrymander.258 The district court found that the 
creation of two majority African-American districts was a prima 
facie racial gerrymander which triggered strict scrutiny; however, 
the district court found that compliance with the Voting Rights Act 
was a sufficiently compelling state interest to withstand strict scru-
tiny.259 
The Supreme Court reversed, making Shaw the fIrst case in 
which the Court elevated geographic compactness from a desirable 
attribute to a virtual constitutional requirement for relief from a 
deprivation of racial minorities' voting rights.260 Shaw foreshad-
owed Miller and Vera when it invoked strict scrutiny in part be-
cause of the danger that officials elected from deliberately created 
majority-minority districts will "believe that their primary obligation 
is to represent only the members of that group, rather than their 
constituency as a whole.,,261 This rhetoric is ironic: As Professor 
Karlan notes, the Court, while requiring compactness for redress of 
race-based vote dilution, has made it clear that compactness is not 
a constitutional requirement for groups not defmed by race, holding 
that "[d]istricts not drawn for impermissible reasons or according to 
impermissible criteria may take any shape, even a bizarre one.,,262 
Thus, Professor Karlan has observed: "[G]roups or candidates that 
are not identifIable in racial terms-farmers, or Republicans in a 
Democratic region of the state, or gays, for' that matter--enter the 
257. See id. 
258. District 1 began in northeastern North Carolina, and extended southward "until it 
taper[ed] to a narrow band; then, with finger-like extensions, it reache[d] far into the 
southernmost part of the State." Id. at 635. In North Carolina, of course, the north-south 
dimension is relatively short. District 12 was about 160 miles long and much of it was 
no wider than the 1-85 corridor. Its snakelike boundaries ran "through tobacco counlly, 
financial centers, and manufacturing areas 'until it gobbl[ed] in enough enclaves of black 
neighborhoods .... Id. at 635-36. 
259. See Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 461, 470-472 (B.D.N.C. 1992), rev'd, Shaw v. 
Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993). 
260. See id. 
261. Id. at 648. 
262. Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941, 1972 (1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring), quoted in 
Karlan, supra note 3, at 308 (1997). 
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process with a wide array of solutions that can satisfy their politi-
cal aspirations. If they were the controlling force in the redistrict-
ing process, they would draw their own districts fIrst, and those 
districts might well be reasonably compact,,263 
As Professor Karlan notes, Justice O'Connor's shameless use of 
such terms as "deliberate segregation,,,264 "apartheid"26S and 
"balkaniz[ation],,,266 illustrates vividly the Court's retrogression 
toward the Plessy Court's jurisprudence of exclusion. These terms, 
drawn from the long "history of political exclusion of black Ameri-
cans[, were used] as a justifIcation for unseating the fIrst black 
Representatives elected from North Carolina in this century.,,267 
3. Miller v. lohnson 
Like Shaw, Miller v. lohnson268 also involved congressional 
redistricting following the 1990 Census which entitled Georgia to 
an eleventh congressional seat Because of Georgia's well-docu-
mented history of voting discrimination, Georgia submitted the plan 
to the Justice Department for "preclearance" under § 5. The Justice 
Department approved the plan after several redrawings, with the 
fInal plan containing three majority-minority districts, including the 
additional district 269 This "max-black" or "Macon-Savannah 
trade" plan270 severed an urban part of Macon from its original 
district, uniting it with portions of Savannah by what the court 
termed the "narrowest of land bridges.'ml In November 1992, 
three African-American Representatives were elected to Congress 
from the three newly created majority-minority districts.272 Five 
white voters challenged the redrawn districts as a racial gerryman-
der that violated Equal Protection under Shaw. 
The Miller district court ruled that Georgia needed only one 
majority-minority congressional district out of a total of eleven 
districts in the state. Therefore, the district court found that 
Georgia's Eleventh Congressional District had not been created 
263. Karlan, supra note 3, at 308. 
264. See Shaw, 509 U.S. at 641, quoted in Karlan, supra note 17, at 1739. 
265. See id. at 647, quoted in Karlan, supra note 17, at 1739. 
266. See id. at 657. 
'1EI. Karlan, supra note 17, at 1739. 
26S. 515 U.S. 900 (1995). 
269. See id. at 907-08. 
270. Id. at 907. 
271. Id. at 908. 
272. See id. at 909. 
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properly,273 because it was created pursuant to a plan that was 
not narrowly tailored to meet a compelling state interest. On certio-
rari, the Supreme Court agreed that "[r]ace was ... the predomi-
nant, overriding factor" in the redrawing of the Eleventh Dis-
triCt,274 and described the creation of the eleventh district as "a 
tale of disparity, not community,,,275 in part because the district 
included residents of four discrete, widely spaced urban centers that 
had nothing to do with each other. The Court therefore invalidated 
the plan under a strict scrutiny analysis. 
The Court's analysis in Miller went beyond Shaw, making 
compact geographic districts, which some have termed ghettos, a 
constitutional requirement for minority vote dilution claims. While 
the Shaw opinion invalidated only those minority electoral districts 
that could be characterized as "bizarrely shaped," Miller went still 
farther, abandoning the Shaw rationale, and holding that regardless 
of compactness, race cannot be a "predominant, overriding" factor 
in creating districts.276 Justice Kennedy wrote that "[s]hape is rel-
evant not because bizarreness is a necessary element. . . or a 
threshold requirement of proof, but because it may be persuasive 
circumstantial evidence that race for its own sake, and not other 
districting principles, was the legislature's dominant and controlling 
rationale."zn By invoking the Equal Protection Clause to strike 
down a redistricting plan that had received "preclearance," the 
Court held that regardless of shape, any congressional district could 
be disallowed if race was the predominant factor in the redistricting 
process. Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Souter and Breyer, 
dissented, noting: 
[S]tate legislatures may recognize communities that have a 
particular racial or ethnic makeup . . . in order to account 
for interests common to or shared by the persons grouped 
273. See Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354, 1393 (S.D. Ga. 1994) ("We finally 
conclude and declare that Georgia'S Eleventh Congressional District is unconstitutional in 
its current composition."). The district court assumed that the Voting Rights Act compli-
ance could be a compelling interest that would permit racially-motivated districting to 
survive strict scrutiny, but held that the Voting Rights Act did not require more than one 
majority-minority district in Georgia. See id. at 1381-82. Thus, the plan creating three 
such districts was not narrowly tailored to meet the requirements of the Voting Rights 
Act, and failed strict scrutiny analysis. 
274. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. at 920. 
275. I d. at 908. 
276. Id. at 920. 
m. Id. at 913. 
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together, . . . ethnicity itself can tie people together. . . . 
For this reason, ethnicity is a significant force in political 
life .... Our Nation's cities are full of districts identified 
by their ethnic character-Chinese, Irish, Italian, Jewish, 
Polish, Russian, for example. The creation of ethnic dis-
tricts reflecting felt identity is not ordinarily viewed as 
offensive or demeaning to those included in the delinea-
tion.278 
D. Bush v. Vera: Requiem for Minority Voting 
Rights Remedies 
In 1996, the Supreme Court's conservative faction, after a de-
cade of chipping away at voting rights remedies by requiring ghet-
tos and proof of intentional discrimination went a step further, and 
for all intents and purposed repealed the Voting Rights Act as 
recourse for anything other than direct, race-based prevention of 
the act of casting a ballot Until Bush v. Vera,279 the normal rem-
edy for minority vote dilution caused by racially-polarized majority 
bloc voting was the creation of majority-minority districts.28o For 
many years, the Supreme Court interpreted the equal protection 
clause as guaranteeing political281 and racial282 minorities the 
right not to have their votes diluted. In Vera, the Court's conser-
vative faction drove the f'mal nail in the coffm of minority voting 
rights, and signaled the defeat of a century of struggle. Vera flies 
in the face of the legislative history of the 1982 Voting Rights Act 
amendment which states clearly that "even a consistently applied 
practice premised on a racially neutral policy would not negate a 
plaintiff's showing through other factors that the challenged prac-
tice denies minorities fair access to the process.,,283 
:m. Id. at 935, 944-45. 
219. 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996). 
280. See, e.g., Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 74 (1986) (invalidating at-large elec-
tion system and multi-member districts in some North Carolina counties); Ketchum v. 
Byrne, 740 F.2d 1398, 1413 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding that the district court abused its 
discretion by not considering, inter alia, the use of supermajorities in redistricting plan), 
cert. denied sub nom. City Council of Chicago V. Ketchum, 471 U.S. 1135 (1985). 
281. See, e.g., Davis V. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 124 (1986) (finding that political 
gerrymandering claims are subject to equal proIection analysis). 
2S2. See, e.g., White V. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765 (1973) (finding vote dilution by 
means of multimember districts illegal when used invidiously "to cancel out or minimize 
the voting strength of racial groups"). 
283. S. REP. No. 97-417, at n. 117 (1982). 
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Vera arose when Texas became entitled to three additional 
congressional seats as a result of the 1990 census.284 The Texas 
Legislature submitted a redistricting plan creating majority-black 
District 30 in Dallas County, majority-Latino District 29 in Harris 
County, and redrawing District 18, abutting District 29, as a ma-
jority-black distriCt.285 Six Texas voters challenged the plan in 
federal district court under the Fourteenth Amendment, alleging that 
the redistricting subjected them to racial gerrymandering in viola-
tion of the fourteenth amendment.286 
Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice 
Kennedy, found that all but one of the six plaintiffs had personally 
been subjected to racial classification, and therefore had standing to 
challenge the districts in question.287 Analyzing Vera as a mixed-
motive case, the O'Connor plurality first addressed the level of 
scrutiny required.288 Finding that Texas had substantially neglect-
ed "traditional" districting criteria such as compactness, that it was 
committed from the outset to creating majority-minority districts, 
and that it "manipulated" district lines based on detailed racial 
data, the plurality chose to apply strict scrutiny to the districts, 
requiring the state to show a compelling state interest to justify 
their creation.289 The Court made this determination notwithstand-
ing its fmding that "traditional" factors other than race, particularly 
incumbency protection, had clearly influenced the legislature's 
districting plan. 
In invalidating the three districts, the O'Connor plurality cited 
"substantial disregard for the traditional districting principles of 
compactness and regularity, [and the fact] that the redistricters 
pursued unwaveringly the objective of creating [majority-minority] 
district[s].,,290 The plurality rejected the argument that the non-
traditional district lines were necessary to unite communities of 
interest," which had in common a consistently urban character, 
shared media sources and major transportation lines to Dallas, and 
a history of voting Democratic. The plurality also rejected what it 
termed the state's "more substantial claim" that incumbency pro-
284. See Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1950. 
285. See id. at 1950-51. 
286. See id. at 1951. 
287. See id. 
288. See id. 
289. See id. (citing Miller v. lohnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995). 
290. Id. at 1948. 
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tection (traditionally an accepted basis for gerrymandering) was as 
important as race in determining the district's shape. Instead, it 
found that race had a "qualitatively greater" influence on the draw-
ing of district lines than did political motives, which would not 
have been subject to strict scrutiny.291 If political motives had 
been found to predominate, of course, the state would only have 
been required to show that the district lines were rationally related 
to a legitimate state interest, but this would not have been enough 
to strike them down, given Texas' need to comply with the Voting 
Rights Act. To avoid this outcome, the Court announced that the 
obvious political considerations (such as protecting the seats of 
incumbents)292 were merely a "proxy" for race, which justified 
the application of the same strict scrutiny standard to which out-
right racial discrimination is subject. 293 
The Court assumed, without deciding, that a state might have a 
compelling interest in complying with the anti-vote-dilution provi-
sions of the Voting Rights Act, in which case the state would be 
entitled to a "limited degree of leeway,,,294 so long as it applied 
"traditional" districting principles.29s However, the plurality de-
clared that a state could not use § 2 compliance as a compelling 
state iDterest if doing so would require it to subordinate "tradition-
al" districting principles to race-conscious factors "more than is 
reasonably necessary.,,296 In other words, a state whose "tradition-
al" districting standards and history of intentional discrimination 
have placed it within the purview of § 2 may not depart from the 
traditional practices that led to the original Voting Rights Act 
violation. Having set up this standard, the achievement of which 
may well be impossible to achieve in light of the Court's current 
jurisprudence, the Court found that the districts at issue failed to 
meet it, because they were "bizarrely shaped and far from com-
pact.,,297 The Court further found that "those characteristics 
291. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 132 (White, J., plurality opinion). 
292. See Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, supra note 153, at 588 (noting that incumbent office 
holders and their political agents, using the redistricting process, choose what configuration 
of voters suits their political agenda best). 
293. Cf. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991) (holding that race-based peremptory 
challenges do not survive equal protection scrutiny merely because members of all races 
are subject to like treatment). 
:m Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1960. 
195. Id. at 1951-52, 1960-61. 
296. Id. at 1961. But see Grofman & Davidson, supra note 251, at 300 (advocating the 
need for race-conscious remedies in a race-conscious world). 
297. Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1961. 
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[were] predominantly attributable to gerrymandering that was racial-
ly motivated and/or achieved by the use of race as a proxy,,,298 
and therefore invalidated all of the majority-minority districts.299 
Paradoxically, this holding means that even if traditional districting 
practices have resulted in allowing polarized white voting to defeat 
black-preferred candidates on a consistent basis, a state may not 
depart from those practices even to achieve compliance with the 
Voting Rights Act and to level the playing field for minority vot-
ers.3OO 
The Vera rationale reflects the spirit of Justice Joseph P. 
Bradley, whose majority opinion in Plessy v. Ferguson301 held 
that segregating blacks and whites in places of public accommoda-
tion did not violate equal protection. Foreshadowing the current 
Court, Justice Bradley wrote that there must be some stage in 
emancipation when "[the freedman] takes the rank of mere citizen, 
and ceases to be the special favorite of the laws, and when his 
rights as a citizen, or a man, are to be protected by the ordinary 
modes by which other men's rights are protected.,,302 In a centu-
ry, the Court has come full cycle, approaching the twenty-first 
century with the spirit of the nineteenth.303 
298. Id. at 1949. Justice O'Connor announced the judgment of the Court and delivered 
an opinion, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy joined; Justices 
O'Connor and Kennedy filed separate concurring opinions. Justices Thomas and Scalia 
joined in still another concurring opinion which took the view that the application of 
strict scrutiny in Vera was never a close question, since the intentional creation of majori-
ty-minority districts, by itself, is sufficient to invoke such scrutiny. See id. (Thomas, J. 
concurring); see also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 201 (1995) (stat-
ing that all government classifications based on race trigger strict scrutiny); Miller v. 
Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 920-21 (1995) (holding that Georgia's admission that it intention-
ally created majority-minority districts showed that race was a predominant, motivating 
factor in its redistricting). 
299. See Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1951. 
300. In dissent, Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Souter argued that pursuit of the 
_ majority's color blind logic leads ultimately to declaring the Voting Rights Act unconstitu-
tional. See id. at 2010-11 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
301. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Board of 
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
302. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883); if. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. 
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1972) (holding that education is not a fundamental right, and 
tha! disparities in tax basis between Texas school districts did not violate Equal Protection 
Clause). 
303. The Supreme Court's "color blind" stance parallels strikingly the reasoning in such 
cases as Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213 (1898) (upholding a literacy requirement 
for voters because it did not discriminate on its face). In an interesting foreshadowing of 
the Rehnquist Court's intent requirement, the 1898 Court found that the laws in question 
had been enacted for a discriminatory purpose, but held the appellant's allegation of dis-
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If participation were the only issue, of course, the COurt'S 
"color blind" approach would be less harmful. However, if the 
right to vote is to mean anything at all, it must mean something 
akin to the due process right to be heard; it must be more than a 
pro forma ritual. Just as a sham trial does not satisfy due process, 
the mere ritual formality of casting a vote does not satisfy equal 
protection.304 The Court's destruction of the Voting Rights Act 
removes all restraints on what has been termed "the superior force 
of an interested and over-bearing [white] majority ... ignoring the 
interests of racial minorities and their claims to equal respect and 
treatment in the governance process.,,3OS The reality is that as we 
approach the end of the twentieth century, most direct obstacles to 
the casting of ballots have been eliminated.306 For all practical 
purposes, the Supreme Court's refusal to allow race to be any part 
of redistricting decisions puts an end to any minority group using 
the Voting Rights Act as a means to redress de jure discrimination. 
IV. CONCLUSION: ENnING TIlE CYCLES: A RETuRN TO EQUAL 
PROTECTION 
Most. voting restrictions are subject to strict scrutiny under the 
Equal Protection Clause,307 so that a state must prove that a vot-
ing restriction is narrowly tailored to protect a compelling state 
interest, and that no less-restrictive means are available. Felon 
crimination insufficient as a matter of law because it failed to allege how, when, and by 
whom the discrimination was carried out. See id. " 
3G4. See Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REv. 
29, 30, 39-48 (1985) (suggesting that "Madisonian Republicanism" is really an "intennedi-
ate position" between the traditional republicanism espoused by the Anti-federalists and 
interest-group pluralism). For example, Madison rejected the traditional republican model 
which argued that direct participation in small republics would prevent faction and tyranny 
of the majority, and he rejected the conception of politics as a process consisting only of 
trade-offs between competing factions. See id. at 46-47. Sunstein further asserts that the 
Equal Protection Clause may be viewed as a rejection of the pluralist view of politics 
because it recognizes the evil of "distributing "resources or opportunities to one group 
rather than another solely because those benefitted have exercised the raw power to obtain 
governmental assistance." Id. at 50-51. 
305. See KarIm, supra note 17, at 1740 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 77 
(James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961». 
306. See Issacharoff, supra note 152, at 1838-39 (noting that outright .denial of oppor-
tunities to cast ballots has for the most part been eliminated); id. at 1842 (stating that 
"precise harms were easy to identify" in denial cases, commenting on the present Court's 
preference for rules that are easy to apply). 
307. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342-43 (1972) (striking a residency 
requirement of one year in the state and three months in the county). 
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disenfranchisement alone is exempted from strict scrutiny. It thus 
has survived constitutional challenge308 despite its racially moti-
vated origins and its continuing racially discriminatory impact It is 
possible that state constitutional equal protection guarantees might 
nUllify such a law, litigation in federal court has been unsuccessful 
because of the Court's reading of section 2 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. As of this writing, Underwood is still the only case in 
which the Supreme Court has struck down criminal disenfranchise-
ment provisions based on the discriminatory purpose for which 
they were adopted.309 Not once in this line of cases has the 
Court addressed the real issue: that disproportionate disenfranchise-
ment of minority voters necessarily dilutes minority voting strength. 
The right to be heard at the polls is now a right without a 
remedy, and the Voting Rights Act stands reduced to a formality 
so insubstantial that cases invoking it are no.w routinely defeated 
on summary judgment. The Court's aggressive anti-minority stance 
is all the worse, given the lingering 'effects of the racially motivat-
ed felon disenfranchisement statutes and the disproportionate 
criminalization of the minority population. 
The right to vote is fundamental to our democratic system of 
government, but sadly, the present Court's defInition of equal rep-
resentation appears to be satisfIed simply by ensuring each individ-
ual formal access to the ballot. The effect that the system has on 
the impact and strength of that vote as combined with other votes 
is not considered.31o Even an explicit amendment to the Voting 
Rights Act that restores the results test and allows for proof of 
discriminatory effects without proof of discriminatory intent would 
308. See u.s. CONST. amend. XV (prohibiting the denial of voting rights based on race, 
color, or previous condition of servitude); U.S. CONST. amend. XIX (granting suffrage to 
women); U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV (ouflawing disenfranchisement for failure to pay poll 
tax or other tax, but not addressing disenfranchisement for tax-evasion under the criminal 
disenfranchisement provision); U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI (granting the right to vote to 
those age 18 and over). 
309, See Shapiro, supra note 35, at 543 (expressing surprise that Underwood "has not 
paved the way for similarly successful suits" challenging other state disenfranchisement 
laws). 
310. See Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Caro1ene Products, 98 HARv. L. REv. 713, 719 
(1985) (noting that the minority acquiescence principle, i.e., that minorities are supposed 
to lose in a democratic system, is entirely consistent with democratic theory); D. Polsby 
& R. Popper, The Third Criterion: Compactness as a Procedural Safeguard Against Parti-
san Gerrymandering, 9 YALE L. & POL'y REv. 301, 315 (1991) (noting that voting is 
not an act of utilitarian self-interest but "a means to affirm the philosophy of popular 
sovereignty"). 
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be unlikely to survive. Nevertheless, these changes should be made. 
In our system of checks and balances, it is intolerable to let the 
oppressive hand of one branch silence the voices in other branches 
that would stand up for protection of minority rights.311 The 
Court should abandon the fiction of the "color blind" Constitution 
and take into account existing civil disabilities in the minority 
population when fashioning remedies, and should adopt an equal 
protection analysis for purposes of identifying and remedying of 
voting rights violations. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins,312 the Court held 
that a facially neutral law which was intended to operate in a 
racially discriminatory manner violated equal protection.313 The 
Court's current stance is nothing less than an abandonment of its 
historical recognition of the right of a minority community to rep-
resentation of its interests. 
At least one commentator14 has suggested that the § 2 "re-
sults" test could serve as a tool for overturning criminal disenfran-
chisement laws where they dilute minority voting strength.3lS He 
argues that plaintiffs could show that such laws deny the vote to a 
disproportionately non-white class of citizens, resulting in dilution 
of the voting strength of the minority community, and thereby 
establishing the laws' invalidity under § 2.316 With Vera, how-
ever, the Supreme Court has effectively read the results test out of 
the Voting Rights Act, precluding such a strategy. Under the 
Court's current approach, it would be difficult to demonstrate that 
those directly disenfranchised have been denied the vote "on ac-
count of race." Proving vote dilution would also be difficult De-
spite the fact that the 1982 Voting Rights Act amendments' legisla-
tive history advises· courts to consider statistical data in applying 
the results test, assessing the impact of the challenged measure 
based on objective factors, there is no indication in the Supreme 
Court's recent holdings that it would accept such statistical evi-
311. James Madison recognized that the tendency to fonn factions is ingrained in hu-
man nature, see THE FEDERAIJST Nos., 10, 45, 46, 49 (James Madison), but urged that 
"the majority, having such coexistent passion or interest, must be rendered, by their num-
ber and local situation, unable to concert and carry into effect schemes of oppression." 
THE FEDERAI:.IST No. 66 (James Madison). 
312. 110 U.S. 356 (1886) (striking down a reguIatoIy ordinance that affected Chinese more 
than whites; the Court found a discriminatory purpose based on an otherwise unexplainable differ-
ential impact on a minority group). 
313. Id. 
314. See Shapiro, supra note 35, at 543. 
315. Id. at 543-44. 
316. See generally Shapiro, supra note 35. 
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dence absent a showing that the individual convict had been denied 
the vote based explicitly on race. On the contrary, minority citizens 
are rapidly losing ground in the battle to influence outcomes at the 
ballot box, and that they can expect no recourse from the right-
wing majority on the Rehnquist Court. 
The case of felon disenfranchisement shows how devastating 
has been the impact of the Supreme Court's "color blind" jurispru-
dence, culminating in Bush v. Vera.317 When considered in the 
light of the disproportionate representation of African-Americans 
and other minorities in the criminal justice system, felon disenfran-
chise should trigger equal protection concerns. There is indisputable 
evidence that the disenfranchisement laws are the product of inten-
tional discrimination, and that they operate with a disproportionate 
impact on minority voting pools, leading to a classic case of vote 
dilution. Quite simply, the disenfranchisement of felons reduces 
electoral access for minority popUlations as a whole,318 and in the 
post-Vera era, no remedy can be framed, even though both dis-
criminatory intent and discriminatory results are present. Nothing 
could illustrate more clearly the way in which disproportionate 
criminalization of minorities has interacted with "color-blind" juris-
prudence to render violations of the Fifteenth Amendment or the 
Voting Rights Act wrongs without a remedy. 
Many vote dilution remedies have been proposed.319 Propor-
tional voting, for example, has been considered by legal minds as 
diverse as Professor Lani Guinier20 and Rep. John C. Calhoun, 
"the South Carolina Machiavelli.,,321 According to Professor Mary 
A. Inman, a proponent of proportional voting, our present electoral 
system can fairly be "labelled 'extreme majority rule' because the 
votes of members of any group constituting a minority in a given 
317. 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996). The Supreme Court's voting rights jurisprudence has been 
aptly described as "teeter[ing] on the brink of legal incoherence and political chaos." 
Richard H. Pildes, Principled Limitations on Racial and Partisan Redistricting, 106 YALE 
LJ. 2505, 2507 (1997). 
318. Shapiro, supra note 35, at 547-48. 
319. See, e.g., id. at 548 n.60 (suggesting a first amendment strict scrutiny analysis of 
felon disenfranchisement on the theory that disenfranchisement silences political speech, 
"one of the most fundamental means by which a citizen can speak or express herself 
politically . . • "). 
320. See GU1NIER, TYRANNY OF UiE MAJORITY, supra note 3, at 72 (1994) (stating that 
the Voting Rights Act should embody the civil rights movement's "transformative vision 
of politics"); Guinier, Triumph of Tokenism, supra note 3, at 1084-85 (analyzing various 
voting strategies in the context of the civil rights movement's quest for human dignity). 
321. AsHMORE, supra note 118, at 390. 
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district. are essentially wasted.,,322 "Where blacks and whites are 
geographically separate, race-conscious districting by definition 
isolates blacks from potential white allies such as white women 
who are not geographically concentrated. ,,323 Furthermore, she 
contends that "because majority minority districts isolate the minor-
ity groups, leaving other districts whiter and more Republican, the 
representative of a majority minority district is unlikely to exert 
significant influence within the legislature: the white representatives 
from the remaining districts will likely predominate.,,324 The 
greatest difficulty with any of these proposed solutions, however, is 
that the current Court's willful color-blindness is unlikely to permit 
any of them to be implemented.32S 
The unholy trinity of Shaw, Miller and Vera have spawned a 
host of lawsuits challenging majority-minority districts in various 
states.326 The Supreme Court has reached a nadir in its equal 
protection jurisprudence and has made a mockery of the struggle 
for electoral representation. The remedies are only invoked when 
minority-preferred candidates are systematically defeated by racially 
polarized majority block voting. The Court's voting rights jurispru-
dence flies in the face of equal protection doctrine, and the legisla-
tive history of the 1982 Voting Rights Act As the Gingles plurali-
ty observed: 
Enforcement of Section 2 . . . should not be viewed as an 
undemocratic judicial intrusion into the political pro-
cess. . . . Much of that influence has come from the pres-
ence -of black elected officials with votes to trade within 
the halls of Congress, and it is important to remember that 
they usually owe the creation of their districts not to the 
courts directly, but to the exercise of pressure that Con-
gress vested in the executive branch through creation of the 
preclearance requirement and to the horse trading of black 
322. Inman, supra note 157, at 1993. 
323. Id. at 2051 (quoting Lani Guinier, The Representation of Minority Interests: The 
Question of Single Member Districts, 14 CARDozo L. REv. 1135, 1163 (1993». 
324. Id. at 2052 (citing Guinier, supra note 321, at 1163). 
325. See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996) Only four Justices assumed that § 
2 of the Voting Rights Act is constitutional. 
326. Such states include Florida, see Lawyer v. Justice, 65 U.SL.W. 4629 (1997); Geor-
gia, see Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354 (S.D. Ga 1994); Louisiana, see Reno v. 
Bossier Parish, 117 S. Ct. 1491 (1997); Hays v. Louisiana, 839 F. Supp. 1188 (W.o. La. 
1993), vacated, Louisiana v. Hays, 512 U.S. 1230 (1994); and Missouri, see Tyus v. 
Schoemehl, 93 F.3d 449 (8th Cir. 1996). 
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legislative caucuses within state legislatures.327 
In the early years of this century, W.E.B. DuBois addressed 
"the strange meaning of being black at the dawning of the Twenti-
eth Century. This meaning is not without interest . . . for the prob-
lem of the Twentieth Century is the problem of the color 
line.'0328 Sadly, racial bias is still a fact of life in America at the 
turn of the twenty-fIrst century, and race and fairness issues are the 
unfInished business of our democracy. Discussion of these issues 
must recognize that the nation's recent history means that minori-
ties may have a community of interest. The Court's disingenuous 
attempts to deny any community or commonality of interest apart 
from the majority's interest in maintaining "traditional American 
principles" of geographic racial placement simply exacerbates the 
legacy of racism. To deny equal protection of the laws under the 
pretext of establishing a "color-blind" system is to perpetuate his-
toric wrongs. 
Under the Voting Rights Act of 1964, Congress has promised 
minority citizens that the Fourteenth Amendment will give them -
equal protection at the ballot box. The Department of Justice is 
responsible for earning its name by ensuring that states comply. It 
is time to recognize that vote dilution does deny minority commu-
nities the right to equal protection of the laws, and to recognize 
the lingering discriminatory effect of practices, such as felon disen-
franchisement, originally adopted for the express purpose of exclud-
ing the minority population from participation in the electoral pro-
cess. The Court must resist the temptation to emulate the Taney 
Court, and must do its part to level the playing fIeld. At least the 
Court should take into account the disproportionate disenfranchise-
ment rates among minority populations when fashioning "safe" dis-
tricts under the Voting Rights Act; and provide for an orderly 
uniform method of restoring rights to those who have served their 
time. 
The "color blind" Court has rejected equal protection-based 
voting litigation, in large part based on an extremely restrictive re-
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection 
Clause, and it has for all practical purposes nullifIed the Voting 
Rights Act by reading into it a non-existent requirement of show-
327. KarIan, supra note 17, at 1738-39. 
328. W.E.B. DuBOIS, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK 1 (1903), quoted in Schmidt, supra 
note 5, at 444. 
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ing a discriminatory intent. Justices Souter, Breyer, and Ginsburg 
have had the courage to point out that the "failure to provide a 
practical standard for distinguishing between the lawful and unlaw-
ful use of race," has resulted in "inevitable confusion."329 To 
avoid consideration of race, as the Court's right wing would do, is 
at worst, the Plessy Court redux, and at best, misconceived. 
The Court has radically reduced the number of cases it has 
taken in recent years, so it is difficult not to see an agenda similar 
to the "Mississippi Plan" behind the selective choice of cases in 
which to implement "color blind" erosion of the franchise for all 
but the white majority. As Moorefield Storey replied, when con-
fronted with the argument that segregated housing affected blacks 
and whites equally, "A law which forbids a Negro to rise is not 
made just because it forbids a white man to fall.,,330 
The cycle of exclusion has come nearly full circle, and it will 
not end until the Supreme Court returns to the true meaning of 
equal protection, protecting minority citizens "with the same shield 
which it throws over the white man . . . [both] being alike citizens 
of the United States, both bound to obey the same laws, to sustain 
the same burdens of the same Government, and both equally re-
sponsible to justice and to God. . . .'>331 In the end, we cannot 
justify a return to legally-sanctioned white supremacy by invoking 
the mantra, "Our Constitution is color-blind." 
329. Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1998 (Souter, Breyer, and Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting). 
330. Moorfield Storey, attorney for the appellants in Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 
(1917), quoted in Schmidt, supra note 5, at 504. 
331. Speech of Sen. Howard (May 23, 1866). in CONGo GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 
2766 (1866). 
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Appendix A: 
States WhIch Disenfranchise Permanently or Make Restoration of Ri2hts DIftlcuIt 
Slate: Otatfon: Commentr. 
A!ab= AlA. CoNST. "No penon convicudofafelonyinl"OlviagmoraJ nuPimde •.. shall bequa1iJied lO\"Oteuntil 
an. vm, § 182(b) restoratioo of avil and political rights." 
AlA. COO. Pet!On coavicud of offcmes aoned in article vm of the Constitudoo of Alabama IlllY be 
§ 17·3-10(1994) restored 10 rights oaly by a p3IdOIl. The p31dOll!llll!t specifically mentiOllS restoratioo of rights and 
!Illl!t be =mp3lIied by rCco!ll!llelldation of judge ordistriCl attorney; no restoration allowed for 
peIlOIIS convicud of"1Iwon and impeacluneat." 
Ariza ARrLCo.'lST. No pe:!OD convicud oflrea!Oll or felony bequa1iJied 10 \"Ote in my election un1ess they are 
an. vn,§2 restored their alii rights. 
ARrL REv. STAT. AWl. "Upon completion of probation or a1least 111"0 years from the date of ablolute discharge. a penon 
§§ 13-905, 13-906 Illly have aay alii rights which were lOll or suspended by bis coavictioo restored by the SlJperior 
(West 1996) COUIIjudge wbo seoltlXCd bim or bis successors in office from the county in llilicb ht \\"as 
origjnallYseotellCed." 
Calltornla CALCoNST. Dilqua1i/ication IVbile imprisoned oron parole for felony convictioIl. 
an. n, § 4 (ameoded 1974) 
CAL EIEc. CoDE DilquaIifies penollS in prison or on parole for felony conliction; probation not mentioned. 
§ 2101 (West 1996) 
CAL EIEc. CoDE Provides for caaoe!IatiOll of \"Oting registration upon proof thai the pe:!OD is pre5ellt1y imprisoned 
§ 2201(e) (West 1996) oron parole for felony convictioIl. 
CAL i'ENALcooE Permits application for a certificate of rehabi1itation and pardon under CCI1aiIl ciItumstance5. 
§ 4852.01 (West 1996) 
Florida FlACoNST. "No penon convicud of a felOllY ••• shall be qualified 10 \"Ole or hold office until restoration of 
an. VI, §4 avilrights or=I'I1 of disability." 
FlA STAT. AWl. "Upon conviction of a felony ••• the avil rights of a pet!On convicud shall be suspended ••• until 
§ 944.292 (West 1996) sucb rights are re.lIOred by a full p3Idon. conditional panlon. or restoratioo of alii rights pursuant 
lOS. 8, Art.1V of the State Co1lSdtudOll." 
FlA STAT. AWl. "Ibefolloll"iagpet!01lS are notentided 10 registet or 10 vote: ••• (b) PeISOllS convicud ofaay 
§97.()I1(3)(b) felony by my court of record and 1Iil1lSe civil rights hal"e not been restored." 
(West 1996) 
FlA STAT. ANN. Restoration ocaus upon 1) rectiviag a full panIoa from the Board ofPanlo1lS; 2) ltlviag the 
§ 940.05 (West 1996) maximum term oftbe sentence; or 3) being "mated bis fina1 release by Parole CommissioIl. 
Iowa [OWACo.'lST. "No ••• pet!On convicud of my infamous aime, shall be entided 10 the privileges of m elector." 
an.I1,§5: An infamous aime is "aayaime Illlde punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiaJy." Sa State 
Dilqua1i/ied penollS v. Haubrich, 83 N.W.2d451 (Iowa 19S7).lnordetlo be restored 10 the privilege of melector,a 
penon lito has been coavicud of £II infamous aime must be gil"en a certificate of restoratino 10 all 
of the rights ofatiu&hip by the govemor. 1923-24 Op. Att'yGen. 235. 
Kamas KAN.CONsr. 'The legislature IlllY, by law, exclude peIlOIIS from voting becaulc of ••• commitment 10 aiail or 
an. V,§2 pena1 i1lStitudOIl. No penon convicud of a felOllY under the 1a'll'S of any stzte or of the United 
SlaIes, WIless _ned or restored 10 his civil riRhts. shall be qualified 10 1"Ote." 
Kentucky KY.CoNST. The right 10 l'Ote is del!ied 1) for a conviction of a felony, treason. bn"bely in an election. ·or of 
§ 145 such high misdemeanor as the General Assembly Illly declare shall ope!aIC as an exclusion from the 
right of sufliage. "WIless"restored 10 their alii rights by executive pardon"; or 2) 10 th1lSe llto"a1 
the time ofJhe election are in confinement uodet the ~t of a court for some pena1 offense.· 
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Appendix A: 
Stale$ WhIch Disenfranchise Permanently or Make Restoration of Rights Difficult 
Slate: alation: Commenls: 
Looisiw LA.CONSl'. "{Rlight [to vote) may be suspended .. hlle a person is interdicted andjudicially decIa!ed lIICIllaIIy 
an.~§10 incampetent or is under an order of imprisonment fOI conYiction of a felony." 
LA.CONST. "Full rights of citiunship shall be restored upon tenninalion of state and fedetal su~ision 
an.I,§ 20 foUo .. ing con\iction for any offmse." 
75 Op.Alt'yGen. 75 "Con\icted felon on probation can \'Ote but one on parole is in legal custody and can not \'Ote." 
(1915) 
!dIn!xso1a Mnocco.'iST. A person con\icted of treason or felony shall not be entitled 01 permitted to l'Ote unless theirchil 




MOO!. STAT. ANN. "When a person has betn dtprived of ci\iI rights by reason of a conYiction of a crime and is 
§ 609.165 (West 1992) thetealttrdischarged, such discharge shall restore the person to all civil rights and full citztnship, 
.. ith full right to l'Ole and hold office, the same as if such con\iction had not tilin place, and the 
orderof ~e shall so O!O\ide." 
MWlsRppl MJSS. CONSl'. Voting Rights lost for enumetated offenses: murder, rope, bn'be;y, theft, arson, obtaining money 01 
an.XII,§241 I goods-under fBIse preten5e, PtliIllY, fOlRelY, embezzlement 01 bigamy •• 
Missouri Mo. REv. STAT. Dilenfrancbi=t whlle in prison, 01 on probation or parole fOI a felony, and permanent 
§ 1IS.l33(2)(1993) disenfranchisem fOlelection offenses. 
Mo. REv. STAT. Dilenfrancbisement .. hlle in prison, and permanent disenfranchisement fOI election felonies. 
§ 56t.026(1)(Supp.I993)" 
Nebraska NEB. REv. STAT. Disenfrancbisement for all felonies, until placed on probation. 
§ 29·Il2(1995) 
NEB.REv.STAT. Pro,ilion fOlprobation and resto!2lion of rights. 
§29·2264(1995) 
NewJmey NJ. STAT. ANN. Disenfrancbisemen if conYicted of a crime under the Ia .. l of New Jersey, another state, or the 
§ 2C:S1·3 (West 1995) UnitedSwes. 
NJ.STAT.M."i. Disenfranchisement .. hlle saving a ~ on parole, 01 on probation fOI any crime of New 
§ 19:4-I(S)(West 1995) Jersey, another state, Olthe United States. 
New York N.Y. EUc. u.w Disenfrancllilement if conYicted of a crime underthe Ja .. l of New Yort, another stale, 01 the 
§ 5-106(2Hs) United States, and If the punisbmentis by death or imprisonmenL 
(MeKInoey 1977) 
North N.e <lEN. STAT. Upon being adjudged guilty of a felony, "unless that person shall be first restored to the rights of 
Cudlna § 163-55(2) (1995) citiunship_in the lD3Ill1er prescribed by law." 
Tennessee 'lEN!l.co.'iST. Disenfranchisement fOI an infamous crime. 
an.U5 
TEt.."I.CODEANN. "Upon conYiction fOI any felony, it shall be the judgment of the court that the defendant be 
§ ~2().112 (1997) infamous and be immediately disqualified from exercising the right ofsulliage." 
'lEN!l.CODEM."i. Person eligible to hal'! rights restored "after pardon and right liling, on petition and sholling in 
§ ~2().Il2.ole (1997) c:irtuitcoUlI." 
(Resto!2lion After Pardon), 
ciling In re Curtis, 6 Tenn. 
Civ. App. (611iggins)l2 
(1915) 
VlrgIn11 VA-COm. Dilenfrancbisem upon COD\iction of a felony unless "cilil rights hal'! betn restored by the 
an.U,§ 1 Go,'tlJ1or or other appropriate authority." 
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Appendix A: 
States WhIch Disenfranchise Permanently or Make Restoration of Rlahts DIfficult 
Statt: Otatloo: Comments: 
Wlscom!n WJS.CoNsr. ~ upon conliction of treason or felony. unless rwortd to cili! rights. 
art.m.§2(4Xa) 
WJS. STAT. ANN. ~uponconlictionoftreason,felony.orbnDely.unlessre!toredtocili!rights. 
§6.03(1)(b) 
(WeslSupp.l996) 
WJS. STAT. ANN. RestoraIion OCCU/S upon seMng Ittm ofimprisorurtnt or othll\\ise setIing a ~ 
§ 304.078 (West 1996) 
Wyoming WYO.CONST. "[P)moD.l convicted offelOllies, unless re!tortd to cilll righls. are exdudtd from the dedil-e 
art.m.§27 franchise." 
WYO.CONST. Prohibit.! special1egislt!ive bills to restore cili! rights. 
art. VI.§6 
WYo. STAT. ANN. Dilenfrnncbises upon fdony conviction unless the conviction is reversed, a pardon is granted. or 
§6-1o.106 cili! rights have been re!tored. 
(Michie 1997) 
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AppendlxB: 
StaUs WhIch Do Not Disenfranchise or WhIch Have Automatic or Relatively Simple Restoration of 
Vo&g RIghts: 
State: C1tal1on: Method olRtstonllOll oIFrancblse: Comments: 
AIaIka AlAruSTAT. PenonJll1)' ~gisterupon presenting prooflhal This apparently includcs completion of 
§§ 15.05.030. IS.07.13S.33.30.241 !he pc:sonis unconditionllly discharged from probation andIor parole. 
(Michi~ 1996) CDStody. 
Arl:a Am.CONsT. AlltOmatic upon completion of =nee. Iintoffweonly. 
art.VD.§2 
Am. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 13-912. 16-10I(AXs) 
(West 1992) 
Arkusu ARK.CONsT. Upon disc!wg~ of sent= or paIdon. 
art.m,U1·2, 
G1IIl1Ided by ARK. CONsT. amend. 51. 
§ 11(1)(4) 
Colorado COLO. CONsT. AlltOmatic upon release from col1finemmL 
art.VD.§10 
COlD.REV.STAT.ANN. 
§ 1·2-103(4) (Welt 1993) 
~ OR« GEN. STAT. ANN. Penon JIl1)' ~gistuupon presenting proof of 
§§ 9-4f{a).9463(I) (West 1993) disclwge from coofinemcnt, parole, orprob-
Ilion. m:I proof of pa_ of any m 
Dclawm Da.CONs1". AlltOmaticrcstoration 10 ycan following a 




tiL IS. § 1701 (\981) 
Gtor&!a G .... CONsT. Automatic "upon completion of the sentence.' 
art.ll.§ 1.'3(a) 
Ha1rll'l IIAw.CONsT. No~duringparol~or\\'hil~ Notation on disc!wg~ papers indicales 
art.ll.§2 smiDg suspended sent=; otherwise, IhaI pc:son's ciVIl rights hav~ been reo 
~ lost upon smtencing for felony and stored. 
IIAw.REV.STAT.ANN. automatically restored II discharge. 
§§ 831·2, 831·5 (Micbie 1993) 
Idaho IDAHOCONsT. No one can 1'O:e if COQlicud of a felony II any 
art. VI.§3 pIace, unless restored to rights. 
Rights ~ 011 completion of seruenoe, 
lDAHoCODS probation, or parole. 
§ 18-310 (1997) 
MaIDe ME. REV.STAT.ANN. No~(XOvision. 
tiL 21·A, §§ 111. lIS (West 1993) 
M1rJIaJld MIl. M."'I. COos AlltOmatic upon completion of sentence. Iint·time offende!s only. 
art. 33. § 34(c)(I998) 
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AppendlxB: 
States Which Do Not Disenfranchise or Which Have Automatic or Relatively Simple Restoration of 
Voting Rights: 
Sial!: Cilation: MeIlKd orRestoratlon ofFrancldse: Comments: 
Massachusetts MASS. CONST. No dismfrancllisement except for election of· Correctional institution inmates, who 
pt 1,art.1 fenses. are duly qua1ilied, registered \'OteIS in a 
municipality, have the right to vole in 
MASS. GEN. !J.ws ANN. state elections. Sa Dane v.1Ioa!d of 
cb. 51, § I (West 1991) RegistrarsofVolm ofConoord. 371 
N.E.2d 1358 (Mass. 1978). 
MASS. GEN.!J.ws ANN. 
ch. 55, § 24 (West 1991) 
Montana MONl'.CODEANN. Automatic upln completion of sentence. 
§ 13·1·111(2)(1997) 
Ollihoma OKu..STAT.ANN. Automatic at end of time prescribed in 
til 26, § 4-101(1) (West 1997) judgment and senlence. 
OKl.A.STAT.ANN. 
til 26, § 4-120 (West 1997) 
Pennsylvania PA. STAT. ANN. Automatic upln expiration of 5 years after the While the crimes ofburgiaIy and 
tillS, § 961.501(a) end of imptilonmenL laJCellY are in the nature of crimen falsi, 
(West Supp. 1997) they are not infamous crimes witbin the 
meaningofPA.CONST.art.2.§7. Su 
Commonwealth a reL Hazel v. 
f1anneIy,13Pa. D. & c.Jd58(1979). 
South S.c. CODE ANN. Automatic upon service of the sentence, 
Carolina § 7·5-I2O(BX2}(3) including probation and parole time "unless 
(Law Co-op. Supp.l997) SOOIllt pardoned.· 
Tew TEx.Co.'lST. Automatic, two years from issuance of 
anVI,§ 1 discharge parers at end of sentence; including 
pmbation and parole. 
TEx. EI.EC. CODEANN. 
§ 11.002(4)(A) (WestSupp. 1993) 
Utah UiAliCONST. No felon disenfranchisement pmvision. Prisooen \'Ole absentee in county of 
art.IV,§2 prior residence. Sa Dodge V. E\'3IIS, 
716P.2d270(Utah 1985). 
WeslVl1'ginia W. VA.CONST. Automatic upon service of senIence. As soon as full tennis!elVed, orupon 
art.IV,§1 pardoning. \'Otiog rights are restored. 
Su5IOp.An'yGen.I82(196S). 
W. VA. CODE 
§ 3·1·) (1990) 
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AppendlxC: 
Enumerated Offenses and Categories TrIggering DIsenfranchisement 
Ctaticn FeIooyOl' "IDramoaI" Larceny "Moral EIedIon Other Crimes: ColmIuls 
Treasoo Crime turpitude" CrImes 









ArIamas ARX.COssr. I 
an.m.§2 
CalIfornia CALco.>,;T. I Pmious1y, CAL CONST. 
art.ll,§4 art. IT, I I(repealed 1974) 
disWianchised for any 
"infamoU.\~"I\ilich 
was limited in Otsuka v. 
Hitt, 414 P.2d 412 (CaJ. 
1966), to aimes imilhing 
moral corruption and 
dilOOnesty, because!hese 
branded a aimina1 as a 
threaIto the integrity oflhe 
eleclive process. 
Coonedlcut CONN. GEN. STAT I (other ronnerCONN. Those imprisoned but not 
ANN. than non- COssr.art. VI, disWianchised can 
§§ 946(a), support) 13(amendcd apparently Iilte absentte 
946a(a) 1875) under CONN. GEN. STAT 
(West 1989) (superseded) ANN. I 9·14a (West 1989) 
etIumcrated ("Any pcIron in !heCUS!· 
bn"bcry, forgery, ody of !he state being held 
perjury, at a community corrections 
dueling, fi1ud- 0etIter ora correctional 
ulentbank· institution. whose lilting 
ruptcy,and rights have not been 
theft. denied, sh3ll bedemed to 
be absent from !he tOlln or 
city of which be is an 
inhabitant for purposes of 
lilting •••• "). 
Ddarue DaC01iST. I DEI..COliST. 
art.V,§2 art. V,f2; 
Qualifications 
DaCOssr. I for Voting also 
artV,I7 disq1Wifies 
!hose unabJe to 
DEI..CODEAl..'I. I readlhestate 
til IS, 11701 constitution in 
(1981) English. 
Ilistrictof D.C.CODEANN. I 
Cdmnbia §§1·1302, 1· 
1311 (1992& 
Supp.1998) 
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AppendlxC: 
Enumerated Offenses and Categories Trlggeifitg Disenfranchisement 
Cltallon Felony or "In!amous" Larctny ''Moral Eifdlon Othu CrImes: CoDIlJlellls 
Treason CrIme torp!tude" Crimes 
Florida FIA. STAT. ANN. I Fonnerly referred 10 
cb. 97.041 (West "infamous" crimes-The 
1987&Supp. florida AItotDey Gw:aJ 
1998) has opined: "In 
cktamining if a aillle was 
'infamous' lIithin the 
oontemp\alion of prior 
\anguage of this section, 
therea! aitetion 10 be 
applied was Ilhe1her the 
offense was one for Mlich 
the statute authorized the 
court to award an inf!mo1a 
punishment, thai is, 
imprisonment in a state 
prison or penitentiillj', and 
oonviction of a person in a 
federal court oCa aime 
oonstituring a felony under 
federal statuleS could be 
deemed oonviction of an 
infamous aime. " Op. Atty 
Gen. 203 (1951). 
Gtorgla GA.CONST.art. I 
U,11,'13(a) 
GA. COOEANN. I I 
21·2·219(a.I)(I) 
Hawal'l HAw.REV.STAT. I Upon sentencing for a 
ANN. felony unless sentence is 
1831·2 suspended. 
(Michie 1993) 
Idaho IDAHO co.'m'. I Before it was amended in 
art. VI,13 1981,IDAHOCOIm'.art. 
VI, I 3 disenfranchised 
IOAHOCOOE those oonfined in prison on 
118-310(1997) oonviction of aiminaI 
offenses, as well as those 
oonvicted of felony, trea-
son, embeuIement of the 
public funds, b3!tering or 
selling, or offering 10 barter 
or sell his vote, or 
purchasing or offering 10 
purthase the \'Ote of 
another, or other infamous 
aimes. 
Indiana iND.COIm'. I 
art.U,18 
Iowa IOWACO!iST.art. I 
II,IS 
Maryland MD.CoNsr. I I I 
art.1,12 
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AppendlxC: 
Enumerated Offenses and Categories TrIggering Disenfranchisement 
OWlon FelODYOl "lDtamom" Larcuy "Moral EIedlon Otbu Crimes: ComIwlIs 
Trwon CrIme turpltudi' CrImes 
Massachasetts MASS. GEl!. I Only for election offenses; 
l.J."'~M."I. o1her incatcetated felons 






MlslIsIippl MISs. co.'iST. 2lI. Olfenseslilted 
12,§241 inSUlllte. 





NJLcom. I I Treason. bribely &; election 
pt.l,lII.ll olfensesonly. 
NewMwC() N.M. CONSl'. I I 
art.Vll.§1 
Nri N.C.COlisT. I 
CaroIlna III.V.§2 
South S.C.COOEM.'I. I I Anyone 
CaroIlna § 7·5-120(8)(2)- "laboringunder 
(3)(Law.~. disabilities 
Supp.l997) named in the 
Ccnstitutionor 
1895 of this 
Swe." 
TeuntSSee TENN.COlisT. I 
art.1.§S 
Tau TEXcom. I 
art.6.§ I 
VIrlln Islands Vl CODEAliN. I Ten yeaIS upon 111'0 felony 
Iil18. § 263{a) convictions involling 
(1998) I1lOraI tuJpitude; olhenlile, 
one year from discharge. 
Vlrgin!a VA-CONS!'. I 
art.I1.§2 
WIShJn&ton WASl!.CONSl'. I 
(S1Ile) art.VI,§3 
Wisconsin WIS.COlisT. I 
art. m. § 2(4){a). 
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AppendlxC: 
Enumerated Offenses and Categories TrIggering DIsenfranchisement 
ClladoD Felony or ~ La1uny "Moral EiedloD 01hu CrImes: C«mnents 
Treason CrIme turp!tnde" CrImes 
WIO!1llng WYO. CoNsr.l!I. .f 
nr. § 27 
WYO. STAT. ANlI. 
§ 6-1()'106 
(Michie 1997) 
